Digital & Print Membership
Yearly + Receive 8 free printed back issues
$420 Annually
Monthly + Receive 3 free printed back issues
$40 Monthly
Where’s the Gaza Gay Parade? Liberals want to know.
A Column for the Queers.
Part of the work of decolonizing is busting myths and propaganda. There might not be a Gay Pride Parade in Gaza because of Israel’s punishing siege and occupation, but make no mistake, there is a lot of queerness there. One tactic the Occupation uses to dehumanize Palestinians is to convince the world that queer Palestinians do not exist, in Gaza particularly. To paint Gaza as savage and backwards and hostile, where modern liberal freedoms like a Pride parade couldn’t possibly exist. While in many cases, queer people in Gaza have had incredibly challenging lives because of the circumstances, it is misleading to believe that Palestinians are inherently more homophobic than their occupiers. In fact, Gaza is just as queer and problematic as the rest of the world. Our EIP journalist talks to “Adam,” a 20-something queer Gazan who lived in the enclave his whole life before getting evacuated to escape the genocide earlier this year. Adam is using a pseudonym to protect his identity. His story is not meant to represent every queer story in Gaza. But we do want to create a space in “Everything is Political” dedicated to documenting as many queer stories from the region as we can. It is our personal Pride Parade.
ADAM: I was lucky that my dad, while really religious, is really open-minded and cultured. He treats me differently than any other family member or son of his because he knows how different I am. He knows. And my family raised me knowing that I’m different.
EIP: When you use the word “different” — that your dad knew you were different – what does different mean? And then what do you mean “they knew”? Did you talk to them about that differentness?
ADAM: No, it’s not something you talk about because it’s not something that you can feel with your hand. It’s something that you can see and notice, you can know about this and you just let it happen, it’s simple if you want it to be. You either support it or just leave it. And I was lucky to have a really different family than religious Middle Eastern families. They were super supportive– it’s really uncommon in a religious community, in any religion.
EIP: Can you tell me a bit about your family?
ADAM: Sure. My family used to live on the border between Egypt and Gaza. Like the checkpoint on the border before they removed everything and just made up a border back in the day! And part of my family is in Egypt and part of the other part is in Gaza. I’m the youngest in the family. My grandma’s side of the family is Lebanese, from Tyre, South Lebanon. The other part of my dad’s family is from Tulkarim and I have family in Jenin, West Bank. So imagine being me dealing with what’s happening in Gaza, dealing with my family in Jenin, and dealing with my other side of the family in Lebanon. It is like the ultimate situation.
EIP: So are you stressed out?
ADAM: I was raised religious so I don’t really worry. Thanks to religion and being raised Muslim, I do not worry about anything because I believe anything that happens in the world is happening for a reason. One way or another, it will turn out good for you if you let things take its flow and believe it happened for a reason. So I think if anything may happen to any of my family members anywhere in the world, I would get emotional of course, I would be sad for a few days. But then I would move on quickly.
EIP: You’d say you’re still pretty religious?
ADAM: I was born and raised religious. I memorized the whole Qur’an at 12. And then at 13 I hit puberty, and had new thoughts. And I looked for answers to my questions and found peace quickly. All religions are carrying the same message in a different text and I appreciate all of them but I believe I don’t need to be under a specific religion to be more Human.
LOVE
ADAM: I was always aware of my preferences, and I was vocal about it my whole life, teaching myself and others that love is love. At 13, I started experiencing life as a queer person at school. There was a lot of making out and a lot of cuddling but at the same time a lot of harassing — Like, when I’d be walking home, and some boys would be like “you’re such a sexy bitch come do this and that to me oh my god I wanna do this and that to you” even though they are pretty much straight – as they describe themselves but I highly doubt it – and they would sometimes spank me or just do weird shit I didn’t like.
EIP: Can you remember one of your first gay experiences in Gaza?
‘We were kids, he wasn’t Hamas back then, he became Hamas after they bombed his house.’ —Adam
ADAM: There was a friend I went to kindergarten with. He was from a family who were our neighbors and our friends. I met him and he was one year older than me. He was super nice. And we just found ourselves … kissing and things developed from there obviously. And he became someone who I hooked up with all the time. I’m talking about having sex every day for three months at some point. We were teenagers. I think I used all [my] fun back then.
EIP: How gay could you be in Gaza?
ADAM: In schools, being gay is like completely there – you can see it and teachers can see it. If you know, you know. I’ve seen people hugging, kissing and cuddling in class. I’ve done it myself in the class, outside of the class, everywhere. And I was the nice, respectful kid, by the way. I was the teacher’s pet and I had high grades mostly.
EIP: That’s interesting and pretty relatable. What was it like being religious and gay for you then?
ADAM: Well, it’s my whole perspective. I was religious until I was 12 and I remember at 13, everything changed because I figured out that there’s a part of religion that people are too scared to say: the more religious you get, the weirder you get. I got touched by people who were teaching me Qur’an, I got touched in the mosque — I understood that this is not the religion (Islam), it’s the people. But, it also opened something in my head that made me say: “okay, so if this is something that people really want, even religious people want, why is it illegal in my religion?” So trust me, religious people, and even people from Hamas, some fighters actually, some of them are gay, and in the new generations it’s way more common than what you would think. One of them was trying to link up with me. He actually got martyred years ago. I didn’t know he was a fighter until he got martyred.
EIP: Can you tell me a story about one of your relationships in Gaza?
ADAM: There was this one dude who I grew up with, our families are similar, we came from a similar mindset. But we were so different from others, and he knew he was different. And I knew I was different. But we kept it to ourselves. One day, we’re playing football and that day nobody was there except for me and him, and I was just sitting and he was just sitting next to me near the street. The streets were empty by the way. There weren’t many people in their cars, especially in the afternoon because people in Gaza nap. He was so sweet, so respectful, so nice. And he moved a little closer to me and just put his hand on my thigh and just left it there. And I look at him and he looks at me. We both were attracted to each other. I always like to tell gay jokes or sexual jokes. It makes it easier to recognize gay people. It’s just natural. And our love– with this dude– me and him, was natural too. So he starts touching me and I just, I hold his hand– we hold hands and I touch him back. In public! Then I told him, “hey, we’re in the street. Do you want to go inside or something? I don’t want you to get caught.” I was more worried about him than I was for myself.
EIP: Because he was in Hamas?
ADAM: We were kids, he wasn’t Hamas back then, he became Hamas after they bombed his house, but he was very religious. So, anyways, we just go inside, and we’re just walking there, we start making out. An hour and a half of making out. So we went inside, we just started moving forward and kissing and making out and stripping each other and just cuddling with each other. I was eating him out and then Al Maghreb prayer just started and he was like “Can you stop?” and I was like “What?” and he was like “I have to go to pray at the mosque.” His family is dead now and I think he’s gone too now, himself. We were in our early teens in love at the time. Making out with him was something that until this very day I don’t think I will ever have something like that because it was genuine and true, true, true, true, true authentic love before anything and it came from someone I know, he was an honest and a respectful young man.
EIP: Wow. Everybody kind of imagines Gaza as extremely conservative only.
ADAM: It is conservative, what’s the issue with that? But these things are natural. These things you don’t hear of because you don’t need to hear of them.
EIP: Ya, queer life finds a way no matter what.
ADAM: We were together for two months and he stopped seeing me because he’s super religious and he started feeling bad about himself. You have no idea how brave that was from him to take this decision to make out with me to to do all of this with me. It takes a very brave and genuine man to do such a thing, especially when you’re from a conservative family and you’re super religious.
EIP: Do you believe you can be gay and Muslim?
ADAM: You can combine religion and sexuality. Yes, you can. Yes, yes. In General; People will tell you you can’t. It’s just the people who have less understanding of life, very zoomed in and biased towards a specific idea.
‘So trust me, religious people, and even people from Hamas, some fighters actually, some of them are gay, and in the new generations it’s way more common than what you would think. One of them was trying to link up with me. He actually got martyred years ago. I didn’t know he was a fighter until he got martyred.’ —Adam
THE GENOCIDE
In October 2023, Adam was studying. He was also working on his dream on the side, his own clothing line and the start of him getting into fashion. He had been making money from the line while studying at a university in Deir al Balah. At the time, Adam was getting ready to start an apprenticeship in culinary arts in Gaza.
ADAM: That was the 5th of October. Then the 7th of October happened. And everything is gone. The restaurants, the whole square in Gaza, Hay al Rimal. If you know Hay al Rimal in Gaza, it is one of the most beautiful neighborhoods in Gaza. It’s gone completely.
In fact, I know a family of 25 that got completely, like, they vanished, the family vanished, and this family fucking hated Hamas, they were literally Athiests, and weren’t huge fan of religion even, but they got bombed. That’s how you know it’s not about Hamas, it’s about the land and whoever is on top of it.
EIP: Can you explain your experience during the last year?
ADAM: We moved to my sister’s house three days in, and I couldn’t really stand it. My oldest brother, who lives with us, went back to our house. And then my dad followed him and I followed my dad. That’s like three days after it started, so we just stayed at home for a while. Later on, I spent a month in Khan Younis because I just wasn’t comfortable in my area anymore. I felt like I’m gonna die any second because death was literally around me everywhere. Like it was too much. So I just went to Khan Younis because my uncle’s area was safe. It’s a bunch of potheads and a bunch of hippies who don’t care about anything. So that was like a nice place. I went there, I spent a month there, went back to Rafah and I stayed there. The third month people started getting displaced from the north to our neighborhood. And everyone was like, oh, this is “the safest spot in Gaza now.” Well, it wasn’t by the way. Imagine waking up every day to an airstrike in your neighborhood and this is “the safest spot in Gaza.” That’s how wild, how insane the amount of airstrikes there were. Every day from 10 at night to 5 in the morning, there were airstrikes everywhere, and you could hear it. And our house was in the middle of it, and I heard what’s happening everywhere, north, south, west, east, all of it. So it was really hard for me. I would fall asleep and I was looking at the ceiling and waiting for the rocket and thinking of how the rocket is gonna penetrate the ceiling. I was thinking, okay I’m gonna get sucked into the other room, I’m gonna be under this wall, maybe buried underground by all these walls blah, blah, blah. Or an explosive, I’m gonna be thrown somewhere else.
EIP: Were you guys in a high rise, or what was your living situation?
ADAM: We were on the second floor, and it was in Rafah. That’s why we were able to hear everything. I covered most of this from my window, but I was so scared to post anything or talk about anything until the third month of the genocide, actually, because they [Israelis] can and will kill you if you do this. So the third month of the genocide, people got displaced from the north. Our neighborhood was 5000 people at first, maybe 10,000 people. It became 50,000 people all of a sudden. And it’s a bunch of people who seem really privileged. But by the time they came…they didn’t have money to get a haircut. They barely had food. They didn’t have clothes. Nobody was supporting them. And there was way too many of them to a point where they opened governmental schools for them.
I said to my dad – we are really close by the way– “okay, listen, what do you think we could help them with?” He said, “they lack basics first, water, they don’t have water, they don’t have food, they have nothing.” I was like, okay, listen, “how much money do you have?” I told him that I still had all the money from my clothing brand. We started helping them with what we could until people from the neighborhood shared what they could with them. Later on, we started cooking for them from our own pocket money, from the profits I made from my clothing brand. Meat was really expensive. It was 100 shekels I remember. Now, it’s even way more, but yeah, those people hadn’t had protein in two months, and it was so sad, so fucking sad, and we were in the same boat, us and them. So me and my family were like, you may die any second, so let’s just spend all our money, fuck it. Like, let’s be good. We spent like a high percentage of our money on cooking for them. I think the second week I started cooking, I started posting stories for the first time, and I had really bad social anxiety– insane. I’m diagnosed with general anxiety disorder, and my anxiety was really bad.
EIP: I cannot fathom what you were dealing with. How did you eventually get out?
ADAM: So yeah, later on, people started donating to me. And I had a GoFundMe. A GoFundMe for evacuating because my knee was really hurting. When I was cooking for three months, I was, like, feeling pain in my left knee. I put all the pressure on my right knee. Then both knees got fucked up. So I needed to heal. And I needed to evacuate to heal. There wasn’t much in Gaza. No medications even. No painkillers. I wasn’t able to sleep because of the pain. So I evacuated on my own [without my family]. It was a tough decision but I needed it and the pain was increasing. I feel the pain right now as I talk about it, it’s just muscle memory.
EIP: Around when did you get out?
ADAM: It was two weeks before the borders got closed. Like April.
EIP: Woah. You were pretty lucky to get out then. Do you feel lucky?
ADAM: I am very lucky to be alive, PTSD, trauma and all.
EIP: You’re in Egypt now. Do you feel hopeful about the future?
ADAM: Oh, I have nothing but positive thoughts about the future., I’m aiming for 1 million dollars this year from the clothing brand. Really, nobody else can help my family or build their destroyed houses other than me. They’re depending on me. So this year I will work very hard.
Topics:
Filed under:
Location:
{
"article":
{
"title" : "Where’s the Gaza Gay Parade? Liberals want to know.",
"author" : "Afeef Nessouli",
"category" : "interviews",
"url" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/readings/wheres-the-gaza-gay-parade-liberals-want-to-know",
"date" : "2024-11-01 13:42:00 -0400",
"img" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/uploads/2012_12_EIP_18_GayParade_1.jpg",
"excerpt" : "A Column for the Queers.",
"content" : "A Column for the Queers. Part of the work of decolonizing is busting myths and propaganda. There might not be a Gay Pride Parade in Gaza because of Israel’s punishing siege and occupation, but make no mistake, there is a lot of queerness there. One tactic the Occupation uses to dehumanize Palestinians is to convince the world that queer Palestinians do not exist, in Gaza particularly. To paint Gaza as savage and backwards and hostile, where modern liberal freedoms like a Pride parade couldn’t possibly exist. While in many cases, queer people in Gaza have had incredibly challenging lives because of the circumstances, it is misleading to believe that Palestinians are inherently more homophobic than their occupiers. In fact, Gaza is just as queer and problematic as the rest of the world. Our EIP journalist talks to “Adam,” a 20-something queer Gazan who lived in the enclave his whole life before getting evacuated to escape the genocide earlier this year. Adam is using a pseudonym to protect his identity. His story is not meant to represent every queer story in Gaza. But we do want to create a space in “Everything is Political” dedicated to documenting as many queer stories from the region as we can. It is our personal Pride Parade. ADAM: I was lucky that my dad, while really religious, is really open-minded and cultured. He treats me differently than any other family member or son of his because he knows how different I am. He knows. And my family raised me knowing that I’m different. EIP: When you use the word “different” — that your dad knew you were different – what does different mean? And then what do you mean “they knew”? Did you talk to them about that differentness?ADAM: No, it’s not something you talk about because it’s not something that you can feel with your hand. It’s something that you can see and notice, you can know about this and you just let it happen, it’s simple if you want it to be. You either support it or just leave it. And I was lucky to have a really different family than religious Middle Eastern families. They were super supportive– it’s really uncommon in a religious community, in any religion. EIP: Can you tell me a bit about your family?ADAM: Sure. My family used to live on the border between Egypt and Gaza. Like the checkpoint on the border before they removed everything and just made up a border back in the day! And part of my family is in Egypt and part of the other part is in Gaza. I’m the youngest in the family. My grandma’s side of the family is Lebanese, from Tyre, South Lebanon. The other part of my dad’s family is from Tulkarim and I have family in Jenin, West Bank. So imagine being me dealing with what’s happening in Gaza, dealing with my family in Jenin, and dealing with my other side of the family in Lebanon. It is like the ultimate situation. EIP: So are you stressed out?ADAM: I was raised religious so I don’t really worry. Thanks to religion and being raised Muslim, I do not worry about anything because I believe anything that happens in the world is happening for a reason. One way or another, it will turn out good for you if you let things take its flow and believe it happened for a reason. So I think if anything may happen to any of my family members anywhere in the world, I would get emotional of course, I would be sad for a few days. But then I would move on quickly. EIP: You’d say you’re still pretty religious?ADAM: I was born and raised religious. I memorized the whole Qur’an at 12. And then at 13 I hit puberty, and had new thoughts. And I looked for answers to my questions and found peace quickly. All religions are carrying the same message in a different text and I appreciate all of them but I believe I don’t need to be under a specific religion to be more Human. LOVEADAM: I was always aware of my preferences, and I was vocal about it my whole life, teaching myself and others that love is love. At 13, I started experiencing life as a queer person at school. There was a lot of making out and a lot of cuddling but at the same time a lot of harassing — Like, when I’d be walking home, and some boys would be like “you’re such a sexy bitch come do this and that to me oh my god I wanna do this and that to you” even though they are pretty much straight – as they describe themselves but I highly doubt it – and they would sometimes spank me or just do weird shit I didn’t like. EIP: Can you remember one of your first gay experiences in Gaza?‘We were kids, he wasn’t Hamas back then, he became Hamas after they bombed his house. ’ —AdamADAM: There was a friend I went to kindergarten with. He was from a family who were our neighbors and our friends. I met him and he was one year older than me. He was super nice. And we just found ourselves … kissing and things developed from there obviously. And he became someone who I hooked up with all the time. I’m talking about having sex every day for three months at some point. We were teenagers. I think I used all [my] fun back then. EIP: How gay could you be in Gaza?ADAM: In schools, being gay is like completely there – you can see it and teachers can see it. If you know, you know. I’ve seen people hugging, kissing and cuddling in class. I’ve done it myself in the class, outside of the class, everywhere. And I was the nice, respectful kid, by the way. I was the teacher’s pet and I had high grades mostly. EIP: That’s interesting and pretty relatable. What was it like being religious and gay for you then?ADAM: Well, it’s my whole perspective. I was religious until I was 12 and I remember at 13, everything changed because I figured out that there’s a part of religion that people are too scared to say: the more religious you get, the weirder you get. I got touched by people who were teaching me Qur’an, I got touched in the mosque — I understood that this is not the religion (Islam), it’s the people. But, it also opened something in my head that made me say: “okay, so if this is something that people really want, even religious people want, why is it illegal in my religion?” So trust me, religious people, and even people from Hamas, some fighters actually, some of them are gay, and in the new generations it’s way more common than what you would think. One of them was trying to link up with me. He actually got martyred years ago. I didn’t know he was a fighter until he got martyred. EIP: Can you tell me a story about one of your relationships in Gaza?ADAM: There was this one dude who I grew up with, our families are similar, we came from a similar mindset. But we were so different from others, and he knew he was different. And I knew I was different. But we kept it to ourselves. One day, we’re playing football and that day nobody was there except for me and him, and I was just sitting and he was just sitting next to me near the street. The streets were empty by the way. There weren’t many people in their cars, especially in the afternoon because people in Gaza nap. He was so sweet, so respectful, so nice. And he moved a little closer to me and just put his hand on my thigh and just left it there. And I look at him and he looks at me. We both were attracted to each other. I always like to tell gay jokes or sexual jokes. It makes it easier to recognize gay people. It’s just natural. And our love– with this dude– me and him, was natural too. So he starts touching me and I just, I hold his hand– we hold hands and I touch him back. In public! Then I told him, “hey, we’re in the street. Do you want to go inside or something? I don’t want you to get caught. ” I was more worried about him than I was for myself. EIP: Because he was in Hamas?ADAM: We were kids, he wasn’t Hamas back then, he became Hamas after they bombed his house, but he was very religious. So, anyways, we just go inside, and we’re just walking there, we start making out. An hour and a half of making out. So we went inside, we just started moving forward and kissing and making out and stripping each other and just cuddling with each other. I was eating him out and then Al Maghreb prayer just started and he was like “Can you stop?” and I was like “What?” and he was like “I have to go to pray at the mosque. ” His family is dead now and I think he’s gone too now, himself. We were in our early teens in love at the time. Making out with him was something that until this very day I don’t think I will ever have something like that because it was genuine and true, true, true, true, true authentic love before anything and it came from someone I know, he was an honest and a respectful young man. EIP: Wow. Everybody kind of imagines Gaza as extremely conservative only. ADAM: It is conservative, what’s the issue with that? But these things are natural. These things you don’t hear of because you don’t need to hear of them. EIP: Ya, queer life finds a way no matter what. ADAM: We were together for two months and he stopped seeing me because he’s super religious and he started feeling bad about himself. You have no idea how brave that was from him to take this decision to make out with me to to do all of this with me. It takes a very brave and genuine man to do such a thing, especially when you’re from a conservative family and you’re super religious. EIP: Do you believe you can be gay and Muslim?ADAM: You can combine religion and sexuality. Yes, you can. Yes, yes. In General; People will tell you you can’t. It’s just the people who have less understanding of life, very zoomed in and biased towards a specific idea. ‘So trust me, religious people, and even people from Hamas, some fighters actually, some of them are gay, and in the new generations it’s way more common than what you would think. One of them was trying to link up with me. He actually got martyred years ago. I didn’t know he was a fighter until he got martyred. ’ —AdamTHE GENOCIDEIn October 2023, Adam was studying. He was also working on his dream on the side, his own clothing line and the start of him getting into fashion. He had been making money from the line while studying at a university in Deir al Balah. At the time, Adam was getting ready to start an apprenticeship in culinary arts in Gaza. ADAM: That was the 5th of October. Then the 7th of October happened. And everything is gone. The restaurants, the whole square in Gaza, Hay al Rimal. If you know Hay al Rimal in Gaza, it is one of the most beautiful neighborhoods in Gaza. It’s gone completely. In fact, I know a family of 25 that got completely, like, they vanished, the family vanished, and this family fucking hated Hamas, they were literally Athiests, and weren’t huge fan of religion even, but they got bombed. That’s how you know it’s not about Hamas, it’s about the land and whoever is on top of it. EIP: Can you explain your experience during the last year?ADAM: We moved to my sister’s house three days in, and I couldn’t really stand it. My oldest brother, who lives with us, went back to our house. And then my dad followed him and I followed my dad. That’s like three days after it started, so we just stayed at home for a while. Later on, I spent a month in Khan Younis because I just wasn’t comfortable in my area anymore. I felt like I’m gonna die any second because death was literally around me everywhere. Like it was too much. So I just went to Khan Younis because my uncle’s area was safe. It’s a bunch of potheads and a bunch of hippies who don’t care about anything. So that was like a nice place. I went there, I spent a month there, went back to Rafah and I stayed there. The third month people started getting displaced from the north to our neighborhood. And everyone was like, oh, this is “the safest spot in Gaza now. ” Well, it wasn’t by the way. Imagine waking up every day to an airstrike in your neighborhood and this is “the safest spot in Gaza. ” That’s how wild, how insane the amount of airstrikes there were. Every day from 10 at night to 5 in the morning, there were airstrikes everywhere, and you could hear it. And our house was in the middle of it, and I heard what’s happening everywhere, north, south, west, east, all of it. So it was really hard for me. I would fall asleep and I was looking at the ceiling and waiting for the rocket and thinking of how the rocket is gonna penetrate the ceiling. I was thinking, okay I’m gonna get sucked into the other room, I’m gonna be under this wall, maybe buried underground by all these walls blah, blah, blah. Or an explosive, I’m gonna be thrown somewhere else. EIP: Were you guys in a high rise, or what was your living situation?ADAM: We were on the second floor, and it was in Rafah. That’s why we were able to hear everything. I covered most of this from my window, but I was so scared to post anything or talk about anything until the third month of the genocide, actually, because they [Israelis] can and will kill you if you do this. So the third month of the genocide, people got displaced from the north. Our neighborhood was 5000 people at first, maybe 10,000 people. It became 50,000 people all of a sudden. And it’s a bunch of people who seem really privileged. But by the time they came…they didn’t have money to get a haircut. They barely had food. They didn’t have clothes. Nobody was supporting them. And there was way too many of them to a point where they opened governmental schools for them. I said to my dad – we are really close by the way– “okay, listen, what do you think we could help them with?” He said, “they lack basics first, water, they don’t have water, they don’t have food, they have nothing. ” I was like, okay, listen, “how much money do you have?” I told him that I still had all the money from my clothing brand. We started helping them with what we could until people from the neighborhood shared what they could with them. Later on, we started cooking for them from our own pocket money, from the profits I made from my clothing brand. Meat was really expensive. It was 100 shekels I remember. Now, it’s even way more, but yeah, those people hadn’t had protein in two months, and it was so sad, so fucking sad, and we were in the same boat, us and them. So me and my family were like, you may die any second, so let’s just spend all our money, fuck it. Like, let’s be good. We spent like a high percentage of our money on cooking for them. I think the second week I started cooking, I started posting stories for the first time, and I had really bad social anxiety– insane. I’m diagnosed with general anxiety disorder, and my anxiety was really bad. EIP: I cannot fathom what you were dealing with. How did you eventually get out?ADAM: So yeah, later on, people started donating to me. And I had a GoFundMe. A GoFundMe for evacuating because my knee was really hurting. When I was cooking for three months, I was, like, feeling pain in my left knee. I put all the pressure on my right knee. Then both knees got fucked up. So I needed to heal. And I needed to evacuate to heal. There wasn’t much in Gaza. No medications even. No painkillers. I wasn’t able to sleep because of the pain. So I evacuated on my own [without my family]. It was a tough decision but I needed it and the pain was increasing. I feel the pain right now as I talk about it, it’s just muscle memory. EIP: Around when did you get out?ADAM: It was two weeks before the borders got closed. Like April. EIP: Woah. You were pretty lucky to get out then. Do you feel lucky?ADAM: I am very lucky to be alive, PTSD, trauma and all. EIP: You’re in Egypt now. Do you feel hopeful about the future?ADAM: Oh, I have nothing but positive thoughts about the future. , I’m aiming for 1 million dollars this year from the clothing brand. Really, nobody else can help my family or build their destroyed houses other than me. They’re depending on me. So this year I will work very hard. "
}
,
"relatedposts": [
{
"title" : "Argentina’s Migration “Security Turn”: How Javier Milei’s Migration Policies Are Reshaping Belonging in Argentina",
"author" : "Marina Simonet Hernandez Jurado",
"category" : "essays",
"url" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/readings/argentinas-migration-security-turn",
"date" : "2026-03-17 10:39:00 -0400",
"img" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/uploads/Screenshot-2026-03-12-at-4.14.21PM.jpg",
"excerpt" : "",
"content" : "In late January, Argentina’s Ministry of Security published a video on Instagram showing federal forces conducting an operation in Villa Celina, a working-class neighborhood in La Matanza, reportedly searching for undocumented immigrants. Days earlier, a Colombian-born trans man who had requested asylum in Argentina, was detained at the airport for six days, unable to communicate with his family. According to La Izquierda Diario, his asylum claim was rejected, and he was placed on a flight to Porto Alegre, Brazil, under the classification of a “false tourist. ” According to an X post by Alejandra Monteoliva, Argentina’s Minister of National Security, “in December and January, nearly 5,000 foreign nationals were either denied entry or expelled from the country”. These episodes unfolded amid significant changes to Argentina’s immigration governance. Before Javier Milei took office in December 2023, immigration policy fell under the Ministry of the Interior, but former Minister Patricia Bullrich transferred oversight of immigration to the Ministry of National Security in November 2025, effectively redefining migration not as a matter of civil administration, but as an issue of national security. There have been no large-scale arrests of undocumented migrants in Argentina. Yet the symbolic force of security operations in poor neighborhoods and the high-profile expulsion of an asylum seeker signals to a broader political narrative. Like Donald Trump’s “law and order” rhetoric in the United States, Milei’s discourse relies on nationalist appeals and moral distinctions between “decent Argentinians” and those portrayed as threats. Slogans such as “el que las hace las paga” (an idiom similar to “do the crime, do the time”) compress complex social realities into punitive certainties, repositioning immigrants, workers, and other vulnerable groups as subjects of suspicion rather than individuals with rights. The correlation between Milei’s and Trump’s anti-immigrant policies is clear from the dates of implementation: Javier Milei took office in December 2023 and made no major changes to immigration policies until May 2025 (only five months after Trump took office) with the publication of the decree 366/2025 that announced modifications to the Migration Law, especially in article 114 where the creation of the “Auxiliary Migration Police” was announced. Furthermore, the desire to emulate Trump’s ICE is explicit even from members of the Milei administration, as reflected in these statements published by La Nacion, by a source close to Patricia Bullrich’s office: “The ANM (National Migration Agency) will adopt a security-driven approach. It will be modeled on the United States Department of Homeland Security, including its Border Patrol and the TSA [Transportation Security Administration, which oversees airport screening]. We are working to establish a civilian-police force operating at all of Argentina’s border crossings — an agency that centralizes migration control and maintains comprehensive records of individuals with criminal backgrounds”. Argentina’s Ambivalent Immigration TraditionArgentina’s national mythology celebrates immigration more explicitly than that of most countries in the Americas—a tradition rooted not only in historical narrative but also in constitutional language, and linked to the country’s vast, sparsely populated territory. The 1853 Preamble famously commits the nation to “secure the blessings of liberty … for all men of the world who wish to dwell on Argentine soil,” embedding an explicit invitation to migrants within the country’s founding legal imagination and framing hospitality as a foundational principle rather than a contingent policy choice. Dominant narratives credit European migration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with shaping Argentina’s economic and cultural development, as well as its national identity—one that has often imagined Argentines as descendants of Europeans and, therefore, distinct from the rest of Latin America. However, enthusiasm for immigration was never universal. In 1899, physician and intellectual José María Ramos Mejía wrote in Las multitudes Argentinas that immigration had “made Buenos Aires ill,” contaminating the traditions of established families. This anxiety reflected elite fears of demographic change, urban disorder, and political radicalism. In the context of the country’s expanding capitalist economy, these fears translated into hostility toward labor organizing, often portrayed as a foreign and subversive activity, as unions began to develop under the influence of anarchist and socialist ideas, including organizations such as the FORA, the country’s first major anarchist labor federation, as documented by Working Class History. The state also responded with legislation facilitating deportations, most notably the 1902 Ley de Residencia (Law 4144), which allowed the executive to expel foreigners deemed a threat to public order. Today’s nostalgia for a “good immigration” rests on two fragile premises. First, European migration is interpreted through a contemporary lens that imagines Europe as inherently prosperous and orderly, projecting present-day “First World” status onto a past marked by poverty, instability, and social conflict. Second, that race did not matter. Yet Argentina’s self-image as a predominantly white nation emerged alongside the violent erasure of much of its Indigenous population, including state campaigns such as the Conquest of the Desert, and the marginalization of Afro-Argentine communities. The celebration of European immigration has always been intertwined with racial hierarchy, evident in the markedly different treatment given to European migrants compared to those from neighboring countries such as Paraguay and Bolivia, who were racialized in distinct ways. The distinction between “good” and “bad” immigrants persists, now recorded through the language of legality and security. The False Security ArgumentThe Milei administration justifies its migration policies in the name of public safety. However, official data complicates that claim. Administrative data from the National Registry of Persons (RENAPER) indicates that Argentina has roughly 2. 3 million foreign-born residents, representing about 5 percent of the total population. Compared to countries where immigration dominates electoral politics, Argentina’s foreign-born population remains relatively small. According to 2023 national penitentiary statistics, foreigners account for roughly 6 percent of Argentina’s incarcerated population, approximately in line with their share of the country’s population. These figures suggest that migrants are not overrepresented within Argentina’s criminal justice system. Essentially, migration has not been a central axis of political instability or social crisis in recent years. Framing migration as a primary security concern appears disproportionate to the available evidence and contrasts with claims by President Javier Milei that migrants disproportionately benefit from public services such as health care and education or contribute significantly to Argentina’s economic crisis. Emulation and Political StrategyThe parallels with Trump-era discourse are not accidental. Javier Milei has openly aligned himself rhetorically with global right-wing leaders who frame migration as both a cultural and criminal threat. The emphasis on border control, internal enforcement, and moral categorization mirrors strategies used by U. S. and European conservatives to consolidate political identity around fear and grievance, while also resonating with broader regional trends. Argentina is not an isolated case in the adoption of restrictive migration policies; rather, it reflects a broader regional trend. In Chile, President-elect José Antonio Kast campaigned on proposals that included large-scale deportations of undocumented migrants. Similarly, in Costa Rica, President Rodrigo Chaves Robles declared a state of emergency in 2023 in response to migrants transiting the country en route to the United States, as reported by Reuters. In a recent interview with Louis Sarkozy, son of former French president Nicolas Sarkozy, Milei argued that when a migrant “does not adapt to your culture,” it constitutes an “invasion” capable of “altering the cultural foundations” of a country. Yet beneath this security narrative lies a broader political project. The administration’s economic agenda (including labor reforms framed as “modernization”) favors deregulation and business interests. In this context, anti-immigrant rhetoric functions less as a response to empirical conditions than as a symbolic instrument: it constructs an internal adversary while redirecting attention away from structural economic transformation. The coherence of this narrative is further complicated by reports, including those published by The New York Times, suggesting an alleged agreement between Trump and Milei for Argentina to receive deported migrants from the United States. In this sense, security has become the language through which a deeper class realignment is articulated. Argentina’s history shows that debates over immigration have often reflected anxieties about identity, race, and labor control rather than measurable threats. The current turn toward securitization thus represents not merely a policy shift, but a transformation in democratic language itself. The question, then, is not whether Argentina faces a migration crisis, the available data suggests it does not, but what political purpose is served by insisting that it does, and what this insistence reveals about the broader direction of governance under Milei. By constructing an internal enemy embodied by vulnerable populations, the government seeks to redirect attention to politically expedient scapegoats. This logic is reflected not only in the immigration policies described here, but also in labor reforms that frame workers’ rights as a burden on public spending, the repression of retirees demanding improved pensions, and new restrictions on protest and the right to strike that limit collective organization. Taken together, these measures suggest that immigration restrictions form part of a broader institutional reconfiguration, one that prioritizes the projection of authority over the resolution of concrete social and economic challenges. In doing so, the government reframes manageable social dynamics as existential threats, a shift that risks undermining the very constitutional principles it claims to defend, both domestically and in its international positioning. "
}
,
{
"title" : "Borrowed Geography: How US Bases Serve the Empire",
"author" : "Jwan Zreiq",
"category" : "essays",
"url" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/readings/borrowed-geography",
"date" : "2026-03-17 10:03:00 -0400",
"img" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/uploads/us-syria.jpg",
"excerpt" : "Who are the bases for? For decades, the United States and Arab regimes have rehearsed the same script: the lie that American military presence in the region protects the Arab world, to preserve stability, and to defend against external threats. Hundreds of bases, tens of thousands of troops, naval fleets parked in the Gulf, all of it, supposedly, for Arab safety. But if protection is the purpose, then the question answers itself: protected from what, exactly? The Arab region has endured more wars, more destruction, and more instability since the establishment of these bases than in any comparable period before them. Iraq was invaded. Syria was shattered. Yemen was starved. Libya was bombed into state collapse. Palestine remains under occupation and siege. If this is what protection looks like, then the word has lost all meaning.",
"content" : "Who are the bases for? For decades, the United States and Arab regimes have rehearsed the same script: the lie that American military presence in the region protects the Arab world, to preserve stability, and to defend against external threats. Hundreds of bases, tens of thousands of troops, naval fleets parked in the Gulf, all of it, supposedly, for Arab safety. But if protection is the purpose, then the question answers itself: protected from what, exactly? The Arab region has endured more wars, more destruction, and more instability since the establishment of these bases than in any comparable period before them. Iraq was invaded. Syria was shattered. Yemen was starved. Libya was bombed into state collapse. Palestine remains under occupation and siege. If this is what protection looks like, then the word has lost all meaning. The Scale of PresenceThe American military footprint in the Arab region is staggering. The United States maintains forces in more than a dozen countries, with at least nineteen military sites, eight considered permanent. Qatar hosts Al Udeid Air Base, the largest US installation in the Middle East, serving as the forward headquarters for US Central Command with around 10,000 troops. As of mid-2025, roughly 40,000 American service members were deployed across the region. The narrative behind the purpose of these bases were sold to Arab governments, and by extension, to Arab publics, as shields against regional threats, primarily framed as Iran. But the record tells a very different story. They have served as launch pads for the destruction of Arab states, not their protection. What the Bases Did to IraqThe invasion of Iraq in 2003 remains the most damning evidence, and a vital one to read alongside what is happening today with Iran. Here is an Arab country, a founding member of the Arab League, destroyed using bases hosted by neighbouring Arab states. Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and others became staging grounds for an invasion whose human cost is staggering. Population-based studies estimate over one million Iraqi deaths resulting from the war, while the Iraq Body Count project has documented between 186,901 and 210,296 violent civilian deaths. Brown University’s Costs of War project estimates that over 940,000 people were killed by direct post-9/11 war violence across Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, and Pakistan, with more than 432,000 of those being civilians. The bases did not protect Iraq. The bases destroyed Iraq. And the Arab states that hosted those bases were complicit, whether they admitted it or not, in the annihilation of an Arab neighbour. If the bases exist to protect Arab nations from external aggression, then what do you call an invasion launched from those very bases against an Arab capital?At the time of writing this, the pattern is repeating, and it is vital to read what is happening today alongside the record of Iraq. The US-Israeli alliance has launched strikes on a sovereign nation, Iran, calling it preemptive. Unnecessary, unprovoked, and deeply violent. What much Western media has failed to acknowledge is that the strike is unlawful. Not a grey area. A criminal act under international law. The current escalation is driven not by any genuine Iranian or Arab interest but by Israeli strategic calculations that position American bases as staging grounds for strikes against a neighbouring, non-Arab, Muslim-majority country with which Arab states share geography, trade, and centuries of cultural exchange. The shield became the target. Exactly as predicted. Netanyahu’s Guarantee; Peace Is Always One War AwayThere is no better illustration of Israel’s role as the architect of this configuration than the words of Benjamin Netanyahu himself, whose career has been defined by a single recurring promise: destroy the current enemy, and peace will come. The enemy changes. The promise never does and it never will. In the 1980s, Netanyahu told Pat Robertson that the Soviet Union was “a major force” behind international terrorism and that “if you take away the Soviet Union, its chief proxy, the PLO, international terrorism would collapse. ” In 2002, Netanyahu appeared before the US Congress to lobby for the invasion of Iraq. He told lawmakers: “If you take out Saddam’s regime, I guarantee you that it will have enormous positive reverberations in the region. ” Predicting that regime change in Baghdad would trigger the implosion of Iran. In 2015, he returned to Congress to sabotage the Iran nuclear deal, claiming it would guarantee an Iranian bomb. The same language of certainty he had used about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, which never existed. In 2024, he stood before Congress again: “Israel will fight until we destroy Hamas’s military capabilities and its rule in Gaza. That’s what total victory means. ” He framed every front as one war: “When we fight Hamas, we’re fighting Iran. When we fight Hezbollah, we’re fighting Iran. When we fight the Houthis, we’re fighting Iran”. The normalisation agreements of the Abraham Accords were about integrating Israel into a security architecture in which American bases, Arab territory, and Israeli strategic interests become indistinguishable. Even the $142 billion Saudi arms deal is constrained by America’s guarantee that Israel receives more advanced weaponry than any Arab state, a policy known as the “qualitative military edge. ” A deal that, as Foreign Affairs documented, was designed to normalise relations with Israel without demanding, in exchange, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The bases that were once justified as protecting Arab sovereignty now serve a framework that prioritises Israeli security at Arab expense. At no point in this trajectory have the bases served the interests of ordinary Arab citizens. They have served American power projection, Israeli regional ambitions, and the narrow survival calculations of ruling elites who exchange sovereignty for patronage. The geography has been borrowed for decades. The return on that investment has been the destruction of Iraq, missiles falling on Doha, and trillions flowing in the wrong direction. The Geography Reclaims ItselfBut the myth is fracturing. In January 2026, the Iraqi army assumed full control of Ain al-Asad Airbase after a complete US withdrawal, ending more than two decades of American military presence in western Iraq. In Jordan, daily protests after October 7 forced the government to recall its ambassador from Israel; Israel evacuated its own and has not replaced its diplomatic mission since. In Morocco, which normalised relations with Israel in 2020, public support for normalisation collapsed from 31 percent to 13 percent after October 7, and in 2025, the country’s largest labour union called for banning Israeli-bound ships from Moroccan waters and organised protests in support of Gaza. The 2025 Arab Opinion Index, the largest public opinion survey in the Arab world, covering 40,000 respondents across fifteen countries, found that 87 percent of Arabs oppose recognition of Israel, citing its status as a “settler-colonial state occupying Palestine”. Despite the Abraham Accords, support for normalisation dropped even further, including in signatory states. This is not passive discontent. It is a political force constraining governments that would otherwise deepen their alignment with Washington and Tel Aviv. Within the Arab world, a generation of writers, organisers, and researchers from Azmi Bishara’s work on sovereignty and the failure of normalisation, to Abdel Razzaq Takriti’s recovery of Gulf revolutionary traditions, to the policy analysts at Al-Shabaka dismantling the security-sector myth, is building the analytical tools to name what previous generations could not say aloud: that the security architecture sold to them was never designed for their protection, and that genuine regional security begins with sovereignty–not the kind performed at summits and investment forums, but the kind that decides who can and cannot wage war from your soil. The Yemeni blockade of Red Sea shipping, whatever one’s position on the Houthis may be,, demonstrated something that decades of Arab League communiqués never did: that collective action rooted in solidarity with Palestine can materially disrupt the logistics of empire. "
}
,
{
"title" : "Kurdistan and Palestine: Mapping Solidarity Beyond Colonial Borders",
"author" : "Rojin Namer, Jwan Zreiq",
"category" : "essays",
"url" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/readings/kurdistan-and-palestine",
"date" : "2026-03-17 10:00:00 -0400",
"img" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/uploads/shutterstock_232668253-956x539-c.jpg",
"excerpt" : "“No one can understand the suffering of the palestinian people more than the Kurds. No people can share a relationship of empathy more than the peoples of Palestine and Kurdistan. This has been proven by their experiences and joint struggle. It was as such yesterday and it is as such today.” - Duran Kalkan",
"content" : "“No one can understand the suffering of the palestinian people more than the Kurds. No people can share a relationship of empathy more than the peoples of Palestine and Kurdistan. This has been proven by their experiences and joint struggle. It was as such yesterday and it is as such today. ” - Duran KalkanKurds live under imposed borders and know occupation firsthand. People shaped by displacement do not romanticize occupation or occupiers as allies. Kurdish writer Egultekin’s words cut through decades of propaganda that has painted Kurdish movements as Israeli proxies. The truth is simpler and far more painful: the “Kurdish-Israeli alliance” is a narrative weapon wielded by the very states that carved up Kurdistan, designed to turn regional solidarity into suspicion and transform indigenous resistance into foreign conspiracy. As a result, Kurdish and Palestinian struggles have been deliberately misunderstood as competing, when in fact they share a common root. Both of their people live as the largest stateless populations in the world, their identities fractured across borders drawn by colonial powers who never asked for their consent. The Kurds estimated number is 40 to 45 million across Turkey (Bakur), Syria (Rojava), Iraq (Başȗr), Iran (Rojhilat) – names the Kurds use for their own lands– as well as in diaspora. Palestinians number 15. 5 million, scattered across Palestine and the diaspora. Both peoples have lived and survived through genocide, displacement, and the systematic erasure of their existence, still fighting, relentlessly, just to assert their right to exist. The Architecture of FragmentingKurdistan is often described as if it were an absence, a land that does not exist because it does not appear on official maps. This absence is political, not historical. What appears today as four separate “minority” populations spread across widely recognized nation-states was once a connected social, linguistic, and cultural landscape where the Kurds lived as the indigenous people of the mountains, which is where the famous saying comes from, “No friends but the mountains,” a phrase born from watching these mountains given to different countries while the Kurds themselves were denied the ability to move through land that had always been theirs. Those same mountains were also pathways for commerce, escape, and cover for those fleeing or fighting. Many Kurds lived as Koçers–a Kurdish word related to families’ seasonal migration with their belongings, their sheep and goats, between lowland winters and highland summers. Their routes never knew the borders that would later claim to define them. Borders that would turn their ancestral movement into crime, making them “illegal” on land their ancestors had traversed freely for generations. To understand the ties between Palestine and Kurdistan, we must trace the borders that fractured them. In 1916, Britain and France signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement, dividing Bilad al-Sham, the Levant. They partitioned what had been a living geography of different tribes, faiths, and peoples into Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon, carving nations from what was once one land. The same lines fractured Kurdistan across Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, leaving its people stateless across four different borders. The agreement laid the ground for the Balfour Declaration the following year, which promised Palestine to a European Zionist movement while Palestinian hands still worked its soil, cultivating the land while it’s being promised away. These colonial borders made Kurdish existence itself a threat to four different nation-states simultaneously, which means attempts at autonomy have been met with violent repression to this day. Because acknowledging Kurdish identity challenges the legitimacy of the borders themselves, and challenging the story these states tell about who belongs and who doesn’t, also challenging who controls the resources beneath their feet. Kurdish lands, recognized as one of the world’s most significant untapped energy frontiers, holding massive reserves of oil, gas, minerals, and fertile agricultural land, none of which has benefited Kurdish populations. In Iraq alone, Kurdish regions sit on an estimated 45 billion barrels of oil reserves, resources that all four states have consistently fought to keep out of Kurdish hands. Taken together, control over these resources has allowed these states to determine who holds political power and who remains outside it; who sits at the table, and who is never invited. So when we ask why the mere existence of Kurdish identity remains so threatening to the states built on their erasure, the answer lies in understanding how statelessness becomes not just a condition but a tool. Israel’s interest in Kurdish movements has nothing to do with self-determination and everything to do with weakening Iran, fragmenting Iraq. The same imperial logic that created Kurdish statelessness is now offered back as an alliance. Rojava: Liberation, ethnic and gender justice movementIn 2012, amid the Syrian civil war and the withdrawal of regime forces from Kurdish-majority areas, Kurdish political forces in northern Syria began to organize autonomous self-governance. While defending their territories against ISIS, they initiated a political project grounded in grassroots democracy. This radical resistance movement evolved into what is known today as the Autonomous Administration of North Syria. Crucially, what began in predominantly Kurdish areas expanded to include Arabs, Assyrians, Armenians, Turkmens, and other communities as they joined the autonomous regions. The system adapted a council-based structure extending from local communes to district and regional assemblies. Representation is based not on ethnicity nor religion, but on a shared participation in self-governance. In a region marked by unresolved national questions and sectarian fragmentation, this model represents both a rupture and a possibility; challenging the nation-state through decentralization and multi-ethnic coexistence. Crucially, gender equality is not an addendum but the structure itself. The women’s movement within the revolution has transformed social and political life, placing women’s liberation at the center of democratic transformation. In this way, every governing body in Rojava operates under mandatory co-leadership between a woman and a man, with a minimum 40% quota for women’s participation across all institutions, and women’s councils hold autonomous veto power over community decisions, meaning that no law, no policy, or local decision can ever be moved forward without women’s consent. One of the most notable accomplishments perhaps is how the administration has banned polygamy, child marriage, and forced marriage. Equally significant, it criminalized honor killings and gender-based violence –transforming what were once dismissed as private cultural matters into prosecutable violations. Alongside this legal transformation, women formed their own armed units, the YPJ (Women’s Protection Units), founded in 2013 as an autonomous military formation that fought ISIS on the frontlines as independent fighters, defying the narrative of women fighters as auxiliaries to male forces by becoming instrumental in the liberation of Kobani and the rescue of thousands of Yazidis from genocide on Mount Sinjar. Beyond military defense, Kurdish women established their own justice system through Mala Jin (Women’s Houses), a network of more than 60 centers across the region. Here, women resolve disputes, address domestic violence, and challenge patriarchal practices without state or male mediation; offering reconciliation and mediation processes at the community level, instead of through courts or police. Educational academies followed, training women in everything from political theory to cooperative economics, and in the process, they created the infrastructure for women’s autonomous power. In the spirit of women resisting together, Leila Khaled, the Palestinian revolutionary and PFLP member, has consistently recognized the Kurdish struggle as inseparable from Palestine’s. Khaled visited Leyla Güven, a Kurdish parliamentarian imprisoned for opposing Turkish incursions into Syria, during Güven’s hunger strike demanding an end to the isolation of imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan. Khaled draws direct parallels between the partition of Palestine and the partition of Kurdistan, between the denial of Palestinian return and the denial of Kurdish movement through their mountains. A Bijî Kurdistan & Free PalestineKurdish writer Özlem Goner’s words map the liberation path forward when she wrote: “Kurds and Palestinians in this particular context have suffered various forms of colonial violence at the hands of Turkey and Israel respectively, and it is our alliance, together with all the other colonized and oppressed populations of the Middle East and beyond, that can bring justice and peace. From learning to self-defend together, to invaluable moments of solidarity. ”Daily resistance is not always courageous. Sometimes it is a compromise you’re willing to take in simply choosing not to disappear. In both Kurdish and Palestinian contexts, resistance then, is a condition of existence, perhaps the only one available when your whole being is read as a political stance. The question has never been whether there will be one state or two, but whether that state will be based on equality or continue to be based on domination. The map with further fragmentation of lands promises resolution while preserving the very architecture of oppression. So, until the maps and borders reflect justice rather than colonial division, until Kurds can traverse their mountains and Palestinians can return to their lands, the project of liberation remains unfinished. Liberation will emerge, if at all, from the recognition that to be Kurdish, to be Palestinian, is to have one’s very existence made political by those who drew borders to erase it, and that survival itself no state has managed to extinguish. From women governing in Rojava to families returning to olive groves in Palestine, the stubborn refusal to stop being who we are is the political act no state or borders can legislate away. "
}
]
}