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Zaatar Near the Border
This article is from Land Stories, a storytelling project by Jibal, an NGO in Beirut working for environmental and social justice centered on Lebanon and the nearby region.
Writer & photographer: Jenny Gustafsson
Researchers: Angela Saade, Yara Ward, Nagham Khalil, Rana Hassan
Editor: Nisreen Kaj

It is early morning and barely light outside when a group of women arrives at a small field on the outskirts of Qana, a town in the hilly countryside of southern Lebanon. They wear sneakers and comfortable clothes and carry a stack of empty black vegetable crates. The ground beneath their feet is rocky and covered with green plants. There are grass and different kinds of weeds, but also growing among the stones and leaves, the much-loved herb that is deeply rooted in Lebanese and Palestinian food traditions, and is the reason for their coming here today: zaatar.
“The south is known for its zaatar. Sure, you find it elsewhere in Lebanon, but we are very connected to it here,” says Majida Boutros, one of the women. She holds a green bunch in her hands, tied together with a rubber band. She takes a couple of steps, walks over to one of the crates, and drops the zaatar in. The women continue picking herbs as the sun slowly rises in the sky. They are five, all part of an agricultural cooperative in the village. Two of them, Majida and Suzane, are co-founders of the cooperative, which was officially established in 2011 (though it began work in 2007). There is also Ghada Boutros, Majida’s sister, and two others (a woman who goes by the name Um Ibrahim and her daughter) who are hired specifically for the harvest.

Qana, with its dry climate and hilly topography, is an ideal spot to grow zaatar. The herb grows there in the wild, where people forage for it for their own consumption. It is also grown on plantations, where it is cultivated to be sold in the market. Some zaatar is eaten fresh, but most of it will be dried and mixed with sesame seeds and sumac to make herb mixes, also known simply as zaatar.
Zaatar is a generic name for a number of different herbs belonging to the larger Lamiaceae botanical family, which includes plants like lavender, sage, oregano, basil, rosemary, and thyme. Most zaatar picked in Lebanon, including the cooperative’s zoube3 variety, is either origanum syriacum (sometimes called “Lebanese oregano” or “Syrian oregano”) or origanum ehrenbergii, both varieties of oregano that are native to Lebanon and the larger eastern Mediterranean. This zaatar has soft, almost feather-like leaves that are tiny and rounded, and great for drying. Zaatar might also be any of a number of different kinds of wild thyme, which are sturdier and have long, thin leaves. This zaatar, when not dried, is often added to salads, typically with rocca (arugula or rocket) leaves and onion.
The most popular way to eat zaatar is in its dried form, mixed with olive oil and spread on top of manouche dough, then baked for a few minutes in a large oven. Zaatar mixes vary, but almost all include sesame seeds and sumac, a tangy spice made from the pulverized berries of the sumac plant. There are also blends like zaatar Halabi (Aleppo zaatar), with a much longer list of ingredients, such as pomegranate molasses, pistachios, fennel, and coriander. At bakeries across Lebanon, it is not uncommon for people to bring their own zaatar, harvested and dried at home, to use instead of the bakery’s.

When the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO, published a standard for zaatar in 2020, it listed four botanical genera that may appear in dry zaatar mixes: origanum, thymbra, thymus, and satureja. Each of these four, on its own, is the parent of several different kinds of herbs. In Lebanon (and elsewhere in the region), names overlap and vary. Besides zoube3, there’s also zaatar da22 or di22i, words that come from the same root as dukkah, the name for a number of different mixes of herbs, nuts, or spices eaten in the region, most commonly in Egypt. Many Lebanese also simply say zaatar barri (wild zaatar) when referring to the foraged plants.
These different herbs form part of the region’s social and culinary history. The origanum family, for instance, is a Mediterranean herb group: 35 of its 43 species only occur in the eastern Mediterranean (and four solely in the western Mediterranean). The herbs grow mainly in mountainous areas, not necessarily at high altitudes, but on stony slopes. Indeed, the name origanum, made up from the Greek words oros (mountain or hill) and ganos ( joy, celebration), translates to “joy of the mountains.”

The southern Lebanese landscape, with its soft hills and rocky lands, continues in a similar manner in Palestine, where zaatar holds equal, if not more, significance. Just like the Lebanese, Palestinians have been foraging and eating zaatar throughout history. These herbs and the histories connected to them have come to represent the Palestinian people’s belonging to their country, linking them directly to the land from which they are forced away. “As long as there’s zaatar and olives, we will remain,” a saying goes.
Mahmoud Darwish, who has chronicled many aspects of Palestinian culture in his writings, mentions zaatar in his poem “Ahmed al Zaatar,” written in the aftermath of the 1978 Tel al Zaatar massacre in Beirut. “For two hands, of stone and zaatar,” he writes, “I dedicate this song, for Ahmad, forgotten between two butterflies.” Edward Said, in a conversation with Salman Rushdie, said about breakfast that, “It is a sign of a Palestinian home that it has zaatar in it.” Ismail Haniyeh, the now assassinated former leader of Hamas, evoked the political importance of zaatar when he famously said in a 2006 speech that, “We will eat zaatar, grass, and salt, but we will not give in or renounce our principles.”
In 1977, the Israeli government—when Ariel Sharon was the minister of agriculture— imposed a ban on the harvest of wild zaatar.
Foragers, if found with plants, were fined or had their herbs confiscated. The stated reason was environmental—that zaatar was at risk of becoming extinct. But the ban was largely seen and served as a move to target Palestinian culture, heritage, and economic life. It also coincided with a sharp increase in Israeli cultivation of zaatar, an example of the colonial practice of erasing what is seen as “wild” and instead transforming such heritage into schemes that benefit the colonizer.
There are other cases of Israeli laws targeting Palestinian culinary and agricultural heritage as well, such as the 2005 ban on foraging akkoub (another significant wild plant), and the criminalization in the 1950s of owning and herding black goats (the most common livestock animal in Palestine before 1948).

On the other side of the border, in Lebanon’s south, food and agricultural practices have come under different forms of attack since Israel’s genocide in Gaza started in October 2023. Land has been directly targeted, trees have been uprooted and destroyed, and people have been stopped from tending to their lands and harvesting their crops. In March 2025, the World Bank published an estimate of US$6.8 billion in damage and US$7.2 billion in economic losses. Lebanon’s two southernmost governorates, Nabatieh and the South, were the most affected.
“They destroyed everything in our region. Churches, mosques, agricultural lands, trees, houses. Everything,” says Faten Serhan. She sits on the sofa in a bright living room in the mountain town of Jezzine, with views over the rocky slopes just outside the window. Next to her sit her mother, Afife Serhan, and her brother, Mohammad Serhan. The family came to Jezzine when life in their home village of Kfarkela, right on the southern border and among the worst hit during the war, became too dangerous.
“At some point, we started seeing people dying, one after another,” Mohammad says. “The last time I was in Kfarkela, for a funeral, I stopped to water the trees near our house. Soon enough, I realized I had forgotten some, but I thought to myself, ‘No worries, I can do that tomorrow.’ Then, when I came back the next day, every single tree was gone. They had bombed the village that morning.” He grabs a small cup of coffee brought out on a tray from the kitchen. “We had been using all our available water to try and save the life of our trees and land. We had managed to keep everything alive until that moment.”
The family grows many things on their land in Kfarkela, including olives and all kinds of vegetables. Afife’s other son, Ali, runs a popular Instagram account, My Land, where he shares videos of his mother cooking and spending time on the land. The family also has a restaurant where they serve the food they grow.
“We don’t use chemical fertilizers; we believe in natural methods. When you plant with good intentions, everything grows well,” Afife says. They grow zaatar as well, on a piece of land next to their house. “The one we have is rainfed, which means the zaatar has more aroma. It loses some of its character when irrigated. Zaatar doesn’t like too much water, and it needs sun,” she says. Afife says that, most of all, she likes to eat zaatar mixed with olive oil, spread on top of her own bread. Majida prefers it the same way. “We just mix the zaatar with olive oil and some salt. Whether fresh or dried, it’s best that way,” she says.

When Israeli airstrikes began devastating towns and villages across the south, Qana was one of many that came under attack. The sisters and others in the cooperative had to flee, like people all over the south. At the peak in November last year, 900,000 people, one-fifth of Lebanon’s population, were displaced across the country. When the women were able to return to Qana, they found many of their plants dead. They had not been directly targeted but were dried out from the lack of water. “They had been left for two months without any care. We managed to find a few surviving plants, which we uprooted and planted on another piece of land so they could be saved,” Suzane says.
In Kfarkela, the situation is far worse. Much of the village is heavily destroyed, with many homes entirely reduced to rubble. Satellite images and other photos show devastation where life, both human and botanical, used to be. “This is not the first time Israel targets Kfarkela, far from it.
The village was one of the first in Lebanon to be occupied in 1978,” Mohammad says. Four years later, in 1982, Israeli forces returned and began an occupation of southern Lebanon that continued until 2000. During this era, people’s social, political, and economic independence was constantly violated. It was only possible to leave and re-enter the region through Israeli-controlled checkpoints set up on Lebanese soil.
Mohammad says that the period damaged people’s connection to the land. “Everything was destroyed during the occupation. The older generation left with their children; many went abroad to live and study. It created a gap of over 20 years, during which the new generation lost its connection.” The oppressive policies enforced during the occupation were an attempt at slowly destroying agriculture in the south. Vegetables and other produce could no longer move freely, while goods brought over from Israel took over the market. Citrus was left to rot on the trees, as farmers never knew whether their fruits would reach buyers in Beirut and the north.
A bit further away, in the midst of filling one last box with zaatar, is a woman who goes by the name Um Ibrahim, working alongside her daughter. They come from Aleppo in Syria but have lived and worked in southern Lebanon for many years. “We have worked with the cooperative for three years. Otherwise, we often work in tobacco. There’s a lot of tobacco here,” Um Ibrahim says. “But zaatar is easier to harvest. With tobacco, you have to start very early, at four or five in the morning, and pick it leaf by leaf.”
Um Ibrahim and her family fled, like so many others, when the south was bombed. Among the 900,000 displaced by the war were not just Lebanese, but also families from Syria, working in industries like construction and agriculture across the south, as well as people from Sudan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and countries in West Africa, living and working in Lebanon. The death toll from the war continues to grow. In December, one week after the ceasefire agreement came into place, Lebanon’s health minister, Firass Abiad, said that 4,047 people had been killed in Israeli attacks. In October 2025, the UN’s OHCHR reported that at least 100 civilians had been killed after the ceasefire deal was signed, a number that continues to grow.
Facing all of this, the women in Qana are uncertain about the future. “When we came back from the war, I had a lot of emotions. I even told the others, ‘Let’s shut down the cooperative.’ For two years, nothing moved for us, and our savings were stuck. I kept asking myself, ‘Why are we doing this?’” Majida says. Then, they started thinking about trying out a new product: distilled zaatar, which can be bottled and added to tea or juice to help strengthen the immune system and relieve cough and cold. “We already have some plants we will try this with. We have saved leftover parts and stems,” Majida says.
Wild plants, including varieties of zaatar, have been used in folk medicine throughout history. Oregano and thyme, rich in the essential oil thymol, and carvacrol, a phenol (an aromatic organic compound), have antioxidant and antiseptic properties. In Lebanon, Palestine, and the surrounding region, zaatar is perhaps most known for one particular benefit: it sharpens the brain. The day before an exam, children will typically be told by their parents to drink or eat zaatar.
In Jezzine, Afife and her children walk out onto the terrace at the back of the house they are renting. There is a small piece of land next to it, where they grow different vegetables. They have to try new methods and crops, since Jezzine is at a high altitude. In the meantime, until they return to Kfarkela, Ali continues sharing videos of his mother on the land—planting, harvesting, cooking, and preserving.
{
"article":
{
"title" : "Zaatar Near the Border",
"author" : "Jibal, Jenny Gustafsson",
"category" : "essays",
"url" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/readings/zaatar-near-the-border",
"date" : "2025-11-21 09:01:00 -0500",
"img" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/uploads/zaatar-8.jpg",
"excerpt" : "This article is from Land Stories, a storytelling project by Jibal, an NGO in Beirut working for environmental and social justice centered on Lebanon and the nearby region.",
"content" : "This article is from Land Stories, a storytelling project by Jibal, an NGO in Beirut working for environmental and social justice centered on Lebanon and the nearby region.Writer & photographer: Jenny GustafssonResearchers: Angela Saade, Yara Ward, Nagham Khalil, Rana HassanEditor: Nisreen KajIt is early morning and barely light outside when a group of women arrives at a small field on the outskirts of Qana, a town in the hilly countryside of southern Lebanon. They wear sneakers and comfortable clothes and carry a stack of empty black vegetable crates. The ground beneath their feet is rocky and covered with green plants. There are grass and different kinds of weeds, but also growing among the stones and leaves, the much-loved herb that is deeply rooted in Lebanese and Palestinian food traditions, and is the reason for their coming here today: zaatar.“The south is known for its zaatar. Sure, you find it elsewhere in Lebanon, but we are very connected to it here,” says Majida Boutros, one of the women. She holds a green bunch in her hands, tied together with a rubber band. She takes a couple of steps, walks over to one of the crates, and drops the zaatar in. The women continue picking herbs as the sun slowly rises in the sky. They are five, all part of an agricultural cooperative in the village. Two of them, Majida and Suzane, are co-founders of the cooperative, which was officially established in 2011 (though it began work in 2007). There is also Ghada Boutros, Majida’s sister, and two others (a woman who goes by the name Um Ibrahim and her daughter) who are hired specifically for the harvest.Qana, with its dry climate and hilly topography, is an ideal spot to grow zaatar. The herb grows there in the wild, where people forage for it for their own consumption. It is also grown on plantations, where it is cultivated to be sold in the market. Some zaatar is eaten fresh, but most of it will be dried and mixed with sesame seeds and sumac to make herb mixes, also known simply as zaatar.Zaatar is a generic name for a number of different herbs belonging to the larger Lamiaceae botanical family, which includes plants like lavender, sage, oregano, basil, rosemary, and thyme. Most zaatar picked in Lebanon, including the cooperative’s zoube3 variety, is either origanum syriacum (sometimes called “Lebanese oregano” or “Syrian oregano”) or origanum ehrenbergii, both varieties of oregano that are native to Lebanon and the larger eastern Mediterranean. This zaatar has soft, almost feather-like leaves that are tiny and rounded, and great for drying. Zaatar might also be any of a number of different kinds of wild thyme, which are sturdier and have long, thin leaves. This zaatar, when not dried, is often added to salads, typically with rocca (arugula or rocket) leaves and onion.The most popular way to eat zaatar is in its dried form, mixed with olive oil and spread on top of manouche dough, then baked for a few minutes in a large oven. Zaatar mixes vary, but almost all include sesame seeds and sumac, a tangy spice made from the pulverized berries of the sumac plant. There are also blends like zaatar Halabi (Aleppo zaatar), with a much longer list of ingredients, such as pomegranate molasses, pistachios, fennel, and coriander. At bakeries across Lebanon, it is not uncommon for people to bring their own zaatar, harvested and dried at home, to use instead of the bakery’s.When the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO, published a standard for zaatar in 2020, it listed four botanical genera that may appear in dry zaatar mixes: origanum, thymbra, thymus, and satureja. Each of these four, on its own, is the parent of several different kinds of herbs. In Lebanon (and elsewhere in the region), names overlap and vary. Besides zoube3, there’s also zaatar da22 or di22i, words that come from the same root as dukkah, the name for a number of different mixes of herbs, nuts, or spices eaten in the region, most commonly in Egypt. Many Lebanese also simply say zaatar barri (wild zaatar) when referring to the foraged plants.These different herbs form part of the region’s social and culinary history. The origanum family, for instance, is a Mediterranean herb group: 35 of its 43 species only occur in the eastern Mediterranean (and four solely in the western Mediterranean). The herbs grow mainly in mountainous areas, not necessarily at high altitudes, but on stony slopes. Indeed, the name origanum, made up from the Greek words oros (mountain or hill) and ganos ( joy, celebration), translates to “joy of the mountains.”The southern Lebanese landscape, with its soft hills and rocky lands, continues in a similar manner in Palestine, where zaatar holds equal, if not more, significance. Just like the Lebanese, Palestinians have been foraging and eating zaatar throughout history. These herbs and the histories connected to them have come to represent the Palestinian people’s belonging to their country, linking them directly to the land from which they are forced away. “As long as there’s zaatar and olives, we will remain,” a saying goes.Mahmoud Darwish, who has chronicled many aspects of Palestinian culture in his writings, mentions zaatar in his poem “Ahmed al Zaatar,” written in the aftermath of the 1978 Tel al Zaatar massacre in Beirut. “For two hands, of stone and zaatar,” he writes, “I dedicate this song, for Ahmad, forgotten between two butterflies.” Edward Said, in a conversation with Salman Rushdie, said about breakfast that, “It is a sign of a Palestinian home that it has zaatar in it.” Ismail Haniyeh, the now assassinated former leader of Hamas, evoked the political importance of zaatar when he famously said in a 2006 speech that, “We will eat zaatar, grass, and salt, but we will not give in or renounce our principles.”In 1977, the Israeli government—when Ariel Sharon was the minister of agriculture— imposed a ban on the harvest of wild zaatar.Foragers, if found with plants, were fined or had their herbs confiscated. The stated reason was environmental—that zaatar was at risk of becoming extinct. But the ban was largely seen and served as a move to target Palestinian culture, heritage, and economic life. It also coincided with a sharp increase in Israeli cultivation of zaatar, an example of the colonial practice of erasing what is seen as “wild” and instead transforming such heritage into schemes that benefit the colonizer.There are other cases of Israeli laws targeting Palestinian culinary and agricultural heritage as well, such as the 2005 ban on foraging akkoub (another significant wild plant), and the criminalization in the 1950s of owning and herding black goats (the most common livestock animal in Palestine before 1948).On the other side of the border, in Lebanon’s south, food and agricultural practices have come under different forms of attack since Israel’s genocide in Gaza started in October 2023. Land has been directly targeted, trees have been uprooted and destroyed, and people have been stopped from tending to their lands and harvesting their crops. In March 2025, the World Bank published an estimate of US$6.8 billion in damage and US$7.2 billion in economic losses. Lebanon’s two southernmost governorates, Nabatieh and the South, were the most affected.“They destroyed everything in our region. Churches, mosques, agricultural lands, trees, houses. Everything,” says Faten Serhan. She sits on the sofa in a bright living room in the mountain town of Jezzine, with views over the rocky slopes just outside the window. Next to her sit her mother, Afife Serhan, and her brother, Mohammad Serhan. The family came to Jezzine when life in their home village of Kfarkela, right on the southern border and among the worst hit during the war, became too dangerous.“At some point, we started seeing people dying, one after another,” Mohammad says. “The last time I was in Kfarkela, for a funeral, I stopped to water the trees near our house. Soon enough, I realized I had forgotten some, but I thought to myself, ‘No worries, I can do that tomorrow.’ Then, when I came back the next day, every single tree was gone. They had bombed the village that morning.” He grabs a small cup of coffee brought out on a tray from the kitchen. “We had been using all our available water to try and save the life of our trees and land. We had managed to keep everything alive until that moment.”The family grows many things on their land in Kfarkela, including olives and all kinds of vegetables. Afife’s other son, Ali, runs a popular Instagram account, My Land, where he shares videos of his mother cooking and spending time on the land. The family also has a restaurant where they serve the food they grow.“We don’t use chemical fertilizers; we believe in natural methods. When you plant with good intentions, everything grows well,” Afife says. They grow zaatar as well, on a piece of land next to their house. “The one we have is rainfed, which means the zaatar has more aroma. It loses some of its character when irrigated. Zaatar doesn’t like too much water, and it needs sun,” she says. Afife says that, most of all, she likes to eat zaatar mixed with olive oil, spread on top of her own bread. Majida prefers it the same way. “We just mix the zaatar with olive oil and some salt. Whether fresh or dried, it’s best that way,” she says.When Israeli airstrikes began devastating towns and villages across the south, Qana was one of many that came under attack. The sisters and others in the cooperative had to flee, like people all over the south. At the peak in November last year, 900,000 people, one-fifth of Lebanon’s population, were displaced across the country. When the women were able to return to Qana, they found many of their plants dead. They had not been directly targeted but were dried out from the lack of water. “They had been left for two months without any care. We managed to find a few surviving plants, which we uprooted and planted on another piece of land so they could be saved,” Suzane says.In Kfarkela, the situation is far worse. Much of the village is heavily destroyed, with many homes entirely reduced to rubble. Satellite images and other photos show devastation where life, both human and botanical, used to be. “This is not the first time Israel targets Kfarkela, far from it.The village was one of the first in Lebanon to be occupied in 1978,” Mohammad says. Four years later, in 1982, Israeli forces returned and began an occupation of southern Lebanon that continued until 2000. During this era, people’s social, political, and economic independence was constantly violated. It was only possible to leave and re-enter the region through Israeli-controlled checkpoints set up on Lebanese soil.Mohammad says that the period damaged people’s connection to the land. “Everything was destroyed during the occupation. The older generation left with their children; many went abroad to live and study. It created a gap of over 20 years, during which the new generation lost its connection.” The oppressive policies enforced during the occupation were an attempt at slowly destroying agriculture in the south. Vegetables and other produce could no longer move freely, while goods brought over from Israel took over the market. Citrus was left to rot on the trees, as farmers never knew whether their fruits would reach buyers in Beirut and the north.A bit further away, in the midst of filling one last box with zaatar, is a woman who goes by the name Um Ibrahim, working alongside her daughter. They come from Aleppo in Syria but have lived and worked in southern Lebanon for many years. “We have worked with the cooperative for three years. Otherwise, we often work in tobacco. There’s a lot of tobacco here,” Um Ibrahim says. “But zaatar is easier to harvest. With tobacco, you have to start very early, at four or five in the morning, and pick it leaf by leaf.”Um Ibrahim and her family fled, like so many others, when the south was bombed. Among the 900,000 displaced by the war were not just Lebanese, but also families from Syria, working in industries like construction and agriculture across the south, as well as people from Sudan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and countries in West Africa, living and working in Lebanon. The death toll from the war continues to grow. In December, one week after the ceasefire agreement came into place, Lebanon’s health minister, Firass Abiad, said that 4,047 people had been killed in Israeli attacks. In October 2025, the UN’s OHCHR reported that at least 100 civilians had been killed after the ceasefire deal was signed, a number that continues to grow.Facing all of this, the women in Qana are uncertain about the future. “When we came back from the war, I had a lot of emotions. I even told the others, ‘Let’s shut down the cooperative.’ For two years, nothing moved for us, and our savings were stuck. I kept asking myself, ‘Why are we doing this?’” Majida says. Then, they started thinking about trying out a new product: distilled zaatar, which can be bottled and added to tea or juice to help strengthen the immune system and relieve cough and cold. “We already have some plants we will try this with. We have saved leftover parts and stems,” Majida says.Wild plants, including varieties of zaatar, have been used in folk medicine throughout history. Oregano and thyme, rich in the essential oil thymol, and carvacrol, a phenol (an aromatic organic compound), have antioxidant and antiseptic properties. In Lebanon, Palestine, and the surrounding region, zaatar is perhaps most known for one particular benefit: it sharpens the brain. The day before an exam, children will typically be told by their parents to drink or eat zaatar.In Jezzine, Afife and her children walk out onto the terrace at the back of the house they are renting. There is a small piece of land next to it, where they grow different vegetables. They have to try new methods and crops, since Jezzine is at a high altitude. In the meantime, until they return to Kfarkela, Ali continues sharing videos of his mother on the land—planting, harvesting, cooking, and preserving."
}
,
"relatedposts": [
{
"title" : "Mercy Over Speed: Revolutionizing Our Political Imagination",
"author" : "Sue Ariza",
"category" : "essays",
"url" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/readings/mercy-over-speed",
"date" : "2025-12-11 13:40:00 -0500",
"img" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/uploads/Cover_EIP_Mercy_Speed.jpg",
"excerpt" : "2025 was a masterclass in haste.",
"content" : "2025 was a masterclass in haste.Policies rushed to enact a merciless agenda that benefit only the few—President Donald Trump scrapped Biden’s AI executive order within hours of taking office, wiping out safety and transparency requirements as we enter a new digital age. Immigration officials were ordered to quadruple immigration arrests overnight. Food assistance was frozen while billions in relief funds sat unused; hunger used as a pawn in the longest government shutdown in American history. Entire communities pushed not just to autopilot, but to survival—by algorithms that cannot see them, by bureaucracies that cannot pause long enough to understand them, by political actors who confuse immediacy with leadership.Of course, the real crisis isn’t speed on its own. It’s what speed erases: attention, nuance, reflection, and the fundamental truth that human beings are not statistics or administrative burdens. Perhaps nowhere was this clearer than in the State Department’s human rights reports earlier this year. In the name of “streamlining,” references to prison abuse, LGBTQIA+ persecution, and attacks on human rights defenders were quietly removed. The language was technocratic—reduce redundancy, tidy up the narrative—but the effect was ideological: whole communities and categories of suffering erased from national memory.Because the truth is, what speed strategically, ruthlessly, obliterates is the one crucial political practice we need most: mercy.Our world has taught us to think of mercy in opposition to speed, too soft for our lived realities, though it’s anything but that: Mercy is the commitment to respond to harm, conflict, or complexity with clarity rather than panic—with discernment instead of reflex. Mercy is the refusal to collapse a person, an idea, or a crisis into something smaller than it is. Mercy is political imagination: the capacity to see beyond what urgency allows and stay with one another long enough to resist the reflexes that turn disagreement into instant judgment—so we can listen before we attack or defend.But what does mercy actually demand of us? For us to reclaim it politically, we first must understand what it means and how it offers a counter-rhythm to our frantic culture of speed and instant gratification.The word itself tells a story. Mercy comes from the Latin merces—wages, payment, the price of goods. Ancient Romans understood it as a transaction. But early Christians shifted the word toward the sacred: the spiritual reward for showing kindness where cruelty was expected. They moved a word about the marketplace into a vocabulary of grace.Judaism’s rachamim, Islam’s rahma, Buddhism’s karuṇā, and Hinduism’s dayā all insist on the same truth: mercy is a way of recognizing the sacredness in others.That transformation mirrors what mercy asks of us now: to move beyond the logic of exchange, beyond what is earned or owed. It asks us to look at someone who has caused pain, and instead of asking What do they deserve? ask, What does healing require here? It is seeing beyond someone’s worst moment and choosing curiosity over condemnation.But mercy is more than individual forgiveness. It is a way of moving through the world that assumes people are larger than their failures; that redemption remains possible; that, importantly, time is not a scarce resource, but something we can afford to give. Mercy requires attention—what French philosopher Simone Weil called “the rarest and purest form of generosity.” It is why American novelist James Baldwin described love as an active emotion: the daily labor of truly seeing another person, especially when the systems around us tell us to look away.The problem, however, is that attention is precisely what our culture has made almost impossible to give. We are overstimulated, overextended, algorithmically hijacked, not only bearing witness to incredible amounts of suffering, but scrolling past it. We don’t refuse mercy because we’re cruel. We refuse it because we’ve built a world that makes stopping feel unimaginable—impractical.This is why mercy is not opposed to speed; it is opposed to false urgency. There are moments when mercy requires swift, decisive intervention. The problem is not action—it’s reaction: the unexamined acceleration that mistakes immediacy for moral clarity and treats nuance as an inconvenience.Consider how the culture of speed is destabilizing basic public systems. Take the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) that feeds more than 42 million Americans. This year, households faced unprecedented threats to their benefits—not because their needs had changed, not because the money didn’t exist, but because the administration chose to let billions in contingency funds sit untouched. The crisis wasn’t a failure of capacity. It was a political choice dressed up as inevitability.Or look at the rush to implement AI—a race happening not because anyone has thought deeply about what these systems are for, but because companies fear being the last to adopt them. Across industries, AI is being plugged into hiring platforms, healthcare systems, education tools, corporate workflows, and crisis-response mechanisms, often with little understanding of the consequences. “Innovation” has become a justification to move faster than ethics, oversight, or even common sense can keep up. In that scramble to avoid falling behind, speed becomes a substitute for understanding what people actually need and for the mercy that governance requires.A merciful politics would insist that deliberation is not inefficiency but protection, and that slowing down is an ethical requirement. Because the stakes of leadership and governance without it are real: if AI systems are going to help determine who gets hired, who gets healthcare, who receives support, which students get flagged for discipline, then refusing to slow down is not neutrality—it is a political choice with human costs.Our addiction to speed also shapes how we respond to political disagreement. Our culture no longer rewards thinking or meaningful conversation. Instead, it rewards reacting. Watch how career Democrats responded to New York Assembly member Zohran Mamdani’s mayoral campaign in November. Rather than engaging with his proposals on housing, healthcare, or municipal governance, establishment voices moved immediately to demonization. Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer withheld his endorsement entirely. His ideas required discussion, which takes time and attention. His vision challenged party orthodoxy, which requires deliberation to refute or incorporate. Instead of dialogue, we see instant censure, moral panic, and swift punishment.The speed of the response is the point. It signals that dissent is tolerable only when it can be quickly absorbed or quickly dismissed. Ideas that require conversation are treated as threats simply because they resist rapid processing. The issue isn’t whether Mamdani’s proposals are correct (and of course, it remains to be seen how they will actually be implemented); it’s that the reflex to demonize rather than debate reveals a political culture that has forgotten how to think collectively.We see this punitive speed logic everywhere. Students disciplined for language before conversations can happen. Social movements judged by headlines rather than the work. Communities criminalized in real time by social media cycles that flatten context into consumable outrage. We’ve built a society quicker to punish than to understand, quicker to condemn than to contextualize.But mercy could help us move differently. Mercy would refuse to relegate a person or an idea to a caricature simply because the truth requires time. Mercy asks us to hold uncertainty long enough to respond with discernment rather than reflex. It asks us to think—together.Legal scholar Matthias Mahlmann writes that dignity is “subversive,” an insistence that every human life carries irreducible worth. But dignity has a temporal requirement: you cannot witness another person’s humanity at speed. You cannot attend to the complexity of a life if you’re only interested in the fastest possible outcome.This is why systems built around optimization always feel so violent. Algorithmic welfare reviews, automated policing, real-time public shaming—all of them demand that human beings be compressed into categories that can be processed quickly. The violence isn’t just in the outcome; it’s in the refusal of attention itself.Mercy and dignity are inseparable. Dignity names the inherent worth that every person carries; mercy is the discipline that protects that worth in practice. Dignity says there is something unbreakable in each of us. Mercy is how we honor that unbreakable thing, especially when harm or conflict tempts us to forget it. What would shift if our reflex wasn’t How fast can we react?, but How deeply can we understand? What becomes possible when we refuse to hurry past another person’s humanity?Mercy is not sentiment. It is resistance. It is the refusal of dignity fatigue. It is the discipline of witnessing: in political policy, in the conversations we have, in how we treat each other’s failures and hopes. 2025 taught us what haste can destroy. The question now is whether we’re willing to build something slower—and more human—in its place."
}
,
{
"title" : "What We Can Learn from the Inuit Mapping of the Arctic",
"author" : "William Rankin",
"category" : "excerpts",
"url" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/readings/inuit-mapping-arctic",
"date" : "2025-12-02 12:49:00 -0500",
"img" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/uploads/Cover_EIP_Template-Inuit_Map.jpg",
"excerpt" : "This excerpt is from RADICAL CARTOGRAPHY by William Rankin, published by Viking, an imprint of Penguin Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House, LLC. Copyright © 2025 by William Rankin.",
"content" : "This excerpt is from RADICAL CARTOGRAPHY by William Rankin, published by Viking, an imprint of Penguin Publishing Group, a division of Penguin Random House, LLC. Copyright © 2025 by William Rankin.In 1994, the Berkeley geographer Bernard Nietschmann made a famous claim about the power of mapping in the global struggle for Indigenous rights. It was a claim about how the tools of historical oppression could be reclaimed by the oppressed: “More Indigenous territory has been claimed by maps than by guns. This assertion has its corollary: more Indigenous territory can be defended and reclaimed by maps than by guns.” The idea was that by putting themselves on the map—documenting their lives and their communities—Indigenous peoples would not be so easy to erase. Nietschmann was working in Central America, often heroically, during a time of violence and displacement, and he inspired a generation of researchers and activists interested in flipping the power structure of state-centric cartography on its head.But despite the spread of bottom-up mapping projects in the past 30 years, perhaps the most successful example of Indigenous mapping actually predates Nietschmann’s call to action. Just one year prior, in 1993, the Inuit of northern Canada signed a treaty creating the territory of Nunavut—the largest self-governing Indigenous territory in the world—and mapping was central to both the negotiation and the outcome. It remains one of the rare cases of Indigenous geographic knowledge decolonizing the world map.So why hasn’t the Inuit project been replicable elsewhere, despite decades more work on Indigenous mapping? The answer lies in the very idea of territory itself, and in particular in one of the most threatened parts of the Inuit landscape today: ice. The winter extent of Arctic sea ice reached a record low earlier this year, and a new low is predicted for the winter ahead. Yet the shrinking ice isn’t just an unshakable sign of Arctic warming; it’s also a poignant reminder of what Nietschmann got right—and what he missed—about the relationship between cartography and power. In particular, it shows how Inuit conceptions of space, place, and belonging are rooted in a dynamic, seasonal geography that’s often completely invisible on Western-style maps.The story begins in the 1970s, when the young Inuit leader Tagak Curley, today considered a “living father” of Nunavut, hired the Arctic anthropologist Milton Freeman to lead a collaborative mapping project of unprecedented scope and ambition. Freeman taught at McMaster University about an hour outside Toronto; he was white, but his wife, Mini Aodla Freeman, was Inuit (she was a translator and later a celebrated writer). Freeman assembled a team of other anthropologists and Arctic geographers—also white—to split the mapping into regions. They called their method the “map biography.” The goal was to capture the life history of every Inuit hunter in cartographic form, recording each person’s memories of where, at any point in their life, they had found roughly three dozen species of wildlife—from caribou and ptarmigan to beluga, narwhal, and seaweed. Each map biography would be a testimony of personal experience.After the mapping was split into regions, about 150 field-workers—almost all Inuit—traveled between 33 northern settlements with a stack of government-issued topographic maps to conduct interviews. Each hunter was asked to draw lines or shapes directly on the maps with colored pens or pencils. The interviewers stayed about 10 weeks in each settlement, visiting most hunters in their own homes, and the final participation rate was an astonishing 85 percent of all adult Inuit men. They collected 1,600 biographies in total, some on maps as large as 10 feet square.Then came the cartographers, back in Ontario: one professor and a team of about 15 students. The first map below (Figure 1) shows how the individual map biographies were transformed into summary maps, one for each community. For every species, the overlap of all hunters’ testimony became a single blob, and then blobs for all species were overlaid to make a complete map. The second map (Figure 2) shows one of the finished atlas pages along the Northwest Passage. The immediate impression is that the Arctic is in no way an empty expanse of barren land and unclaimed mineral riches. It is dense with human activity, necessary for personal and collective survival. The community maps combined to show almost uninterrupted Inuit presence stretching from northern Labrador to the Alaska border.Figure 1: Top left is a simplified version of a “map biography” from a single Inuit hunter, showing his birthplace and the places he hunted caribou, fox, wolf, grizzly bear, moose, and fish at various points in his life. (The original biography would have been drawn over a familiar government-issued topographic map.) The other three maps show how multiple biographies were then combined into patterned blobs for all hunters and all species. (Map courtesy of William Rankin/ Penguin Random House LLC.)Figure 2: A two-page spread from the finished atlas showing the seven kinds of animals hunted from the settlements of Igloolik and Hall Beach, in an area about 500 by 300 miles: caribou, polar bear, walrus, whale, fish, seal, and waterfowl. (Because of the large number of individual species recorded in the map biographies, some species were grouped together in the final maps.) The blobs are a strong, even overpowering figure atop an unusually subtle ground. Notice in particular how difficult it is to distinguish land and water areas, since the dark shading extends beyond coastlines even for individual species. This map in fact includes the Northwest Passage—the famous sea route around the tip of North America—but the crucial Fury and Hecla Strait (named after the two British ships that first learned of, but did not navigate, the passage in 1822) is almost entirely obscured. (Map courtesy of William Rankin/ Penguin Random House LLC.)Nothing about the cartography was meant to be subversive—or even controversial. For the cartographers, the only message was that the Inuit hunted a variety of species over large areas. But look again at the finished map in Figure 2. Yes, a foreground is layered over a background in the usual way, but the visual argument is strikingly different from a typical layered map in, say, a census atlas, where the foreground data doesn’t stray beyond crisp pre-existing borders. Here, in contrast, even the basic distinction between land and water is often obscure. The maps’ content is the facts of species and area; the maps’ argument is that Inuit culture is grounded in a substantially different understanding of territory than the one Western cartography was designed to show.As a result, this new atlas shifted the negotiations between the Inuit and the Canadian government decisively. Not only did the maps provide a legal claim to the Inuit-used land, documenting 750,000 square miles—an area the size of Mexico—but also a claim to the sea, showing an additional 325,000 square miles offshore.It took many years for the full implications to play out, but the erosion of the land–water boundary became central to the Inuit vision. At the time, wildlife on land was managed by the regional Northwest Territories government, while offshore marine species were the responsibility of centralized federal agencies. The Inuit used the atlas to win agreement for a new agency with equal responsibility over both. At the same time, the Inuit also improved their position by offering their offshore claims as evidence the Canadian government would use—not just in the 1980s, but even as recently as 2024—to resist foreign encroachment in the Northwest Passage. The final agreement in 1993 granted the Inuit $1.15 billion in cash, title to about 17 percent of the land in the “settlement area,” representation on several new management agencies, a share of all natural-resource revenue, broad hunting and fishing rights, and a promise that the territory of Nunavut would come into being on April 1, 1999.It’s easy to count this project as a success story, but it’s also important to remember that it depended both on the government’s own interest in negotiation and on the willingness of Indigenous peoples, or at least their leadership, to translate their sense of space onto a map, solidifying what had previously been fluid. It also meant abandoning claims to ancestral lands that had not been used in living experience and provoking new boundary disputes with neighboring, and previously amicable, Indigenous groups. These tradeoffs have led some scholars to critique mapping as only “drawing Indigenous peoples into a modern capitalist economy while maintaining the centrality of state power.” But for the Inuit, the alternatives seemed quite a bit worse.With the more recent proliferation of Indigenous mapping initiatives elsewhere—in Latin America, Africa, and Asia—the tradeoffs have been harder to evaluate. Most governments have shown little interest in addressing Indigenous claims, and when bottom-up mapping has been pushed instead by international nonprofits interested in environmental conservation, the downsides of mapping have often come without any of the upsides.Yet it’s not just the attitude of the state that’s been different; it’s also the cartography. In nearly all these other cases, the finished maps have shown none of the territorial inversion of the Inuit atlas. Instead, Indigenous knowledge is either overlaid on an existing base map in perfectly legible form, or it’s used to construct a new base map of a remarkably conventional sort, using the same visual vocabulary as Western maps.Did the Inuit project just show the data so clearly that its deeper implications were immediately apparent? No, not really, since the great irony here is that the cartographers were in fact quite dissatisfied. Follow-up surveys reached the conclusion that the atlas was only “moderately successful” by their usual mapmaking standards.The Inuit atlas was a kind of happy accident—one that doesn’t conform to any of the usual stories about Indigenous mapping, in Canada or elsewhere. The lesson here isn’t that maps should be as Indigenous as possible, or that they should be as orthodox as possible. These maps were neither. My take is simpler: the atlas shows that maps can, in fact, support alternative conceptions of space—and that showing space in a different way is crucial.The possibilities aren’t endless, but they’re broader than we might think. Plotting different sorts of data is a necessary step, but no less important are the relationships between that data and the assumptions of what lies below. For the Inuit, these assumptions were about land, water, and territory. These were in the background both visually and politically, and they were upstaged by an unexpectedly provocative foreground. The layers did not behave as they were meant to, and despite the tradeoffs, they allowed an Indigenous community to fight for their home and their way of life."
}
,
{
"title" : "Malcolm X and Islam: U.S. Islamophobia Didn’t Start with 9/11",
"author" : "Collis Browne",
"category" : "essays",
"url" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/readings/malcolm-x-and-islam",
"date" : "2025-11-27 14:58:00 -0500",
"img" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/uploads/life-malcolm-3.jpg",
"excerpt" : "",
"content" : "Anti-Muslim hate has been deeply engrained and intertwined with anti-Black racism in the United States for well over 60 years, far longer than most of us are taught or are aware.As the EIP team dug into design research for the new magazine format of our first anniversary issue, we revisited 1960s issues of LIFE magazine—and landed on the March 1965 edition, published just after the assassination of Malcolm X.The reporting is staggering in its openness: blatantly anti-Black and anti-Muslim in a way that normalizes white supremacy at its most fundamental level. The anti-Blackness, while horrifying, is not surprising. This was a moment when, despite the formal dismantling of Jim Crow, more than 10,000 “sundown towns” still existed across the country, segregation remained the norm, and racial terror structured daily life.What shocked our team was the nakedness of the anti-Muslim propaganda.This was not yet framed as anti-Arab in the way Western Islamophobia is often framed today. Arab and Middle Eastern people were not present in the narrative at all. Instead, what was being targeted was organized resistance to white supremacy—specifically, the adoption of Islam by Black communities as a source of political power, dignity, and self-determination. From this moment, we can trace a clear ideological line from anti-Muslim sentiment rooted in anti-Black racism in the 1960s to the anti-Arab, anti-MENA, and anti-SWANA racism that saturates Western culture today.The reporting leaned heavily on familiar colonial tropes: the implication of “inter-tribal” violence, the suggestion that resistance to white supremacy is itself a form of reverse racism or inherent aggression, and the detached, almost smug tone surrounding the violent death of a cultural leader.Of course, the Nation of Islam and Elijah Muhammad represent only expressions within an immense and diverse global Muslim world—spanning Morocco, Sudan, the Gulf, Iraq, Pakistan, Indonesia, and far beyond. Yet U.S. cultural and military power has long blurred these distinctions, collapsing complexity into a singular enemy image.It is worth naming this history clearly and connecting the dots: U.S. Islamophobia did not begin with 9/11. It is rooted in a much older racial project—one that has always braided anti-Blackness and anti-Muslim sentiment together in service of white supremacy, at home and abroad."
}
]
}