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Cross-Indigenous Dialogue to Bridge Cultural Differences
It seems that, for many people, a “dialogue” looks a lot like an argument, where someone wins based on invisible, yet implicit, ethical standards. This seems to be especially true in discussions on cultural identity and appropriation, where gatekeepers (not culture-bearers) impose very clear boundaries.
Cultures do not have strict boundaries; many borrow (or take) stories and technologies from each other. Something can only ever be fully defined when it is not moving, but that would mean that it is dead. Culture is the current in a river of shared humanity, ever living, ever flowing.
What, then, can it look like to affirm and respect differences, while acknowledging the humanity that connects us all?

Creating Differences
In our attempt to understand the world, we end up endlessly categorizing things into one or the other. In both the scientific arena and the sociopolitical sphere, we have become aware of hierarchies, dichotomies, and differences. In our criticism of certain structures, we are not truly dismantling them; rather, we are constantly affirming them. Even within my field, there is a tendency to contrast indigenous, non-Western values to Western values, usually to show how morally superior we are to the corrupt and hollow West. The most this says is that we value different things, not necessarily that one is better than the other. After all, Western values are indigenous to Western culture in the sense that they evolved through their own history and geopolitical affairs.
As it is popularly understood, a major difference between Western and Eastern cultures is that the former is more individualistic, and the latter more collectivistic. Mindless interaction between the two has been, for better or worse, either by fetish or fear. That there are “individualistic” and “collectivistic” cultures is one of the lazier generalizations in cross-cultural psychology. Furthermore, it has nothing to do whatsoever with geographical location: many cultures in South America are community-oriented, whereas many people from industrialized cultures in Eastern Asia are more ambitious and isolated. When we speak, therefore, of “West” and “East” (or even, Global North and Global South), we are not talking literally; we are talking philosophically.
I was born and raised as a Filipino, so this essay comes from my perspective, shaped by the culture I have gotten used to. It is a Filipino perspective, but it is not the essential or foundational one. But let us be clear: culture is not bound by one’s nationality. There is no singular “American” culture any more than there is a singular “Filipino” or “Japanese” or “Italian” culture. When we say that some people are more or less “Filipino,” we are not setting them against the standards of a culture, but against the standards of a nation, which is an imagined geopolitical thing—and this is largely shaped by the agendas of those in power.
Within what we know as the United States, there are many cultures, and even within a group such as “Asian-Americans,” there are still more varied cultures depending on one’s heritage. Within the Philippines, there are many cultural dichotomies (hating kultural), each representing various social locations by birth, affiliation, or socioeconomic status: taga-lungsod (urban) and taga-probinsya (rural), burgis (elite), and bakya (masses), Kristiyano (Christian, but more generally referring to lowlanders), and katutubo (Indigenous People). There are also nuances by group and by family, which are often lazily described by outsiders in terms of stereotypes.
So, when we refer to “culture,” we are actually just talking about adaptive differences shaped by biology, geography, and history. This applies to small groups, but also to groups that come together. Cultural heritage is how we have survived and decorated the places we call home. Language and fashion develop based on what is useful to us. For example, we Filipinos do not have a native word for snow—we borrow the Spanish nieve—because it does not snow here. However, we do have many words for rice at all stages of its household use, even for when it is past its freshness. We are also shaped by our interactions with other cultures, either by imposition or assimilation.
Much has already been said about the colonial history of the Philippines, and about how many foreign standards are still imposed today. This is true in economics and politics, but also in smaller, everyday things. For example, in Metro Manila, where the thick concrete absorbs the heat of the tropical sun, warm jackets are worn to signify status and coolness. Colonial mentality is often impractical. That said, as writer Nick Joaquin pointed out in Culture and History, many technologies that we enjoy today were brought in through trade and colonization—this includes our modes of transportation, cooking techniques, the printing press, etc. Adobo, the jeepney, and the Barong Tagalog are distinctly “Filipino” even though they are of foreign origin.
There is also much to talk about regarding the interplay of various cultures, and how each one manifests in various places. We can see this in the experience of immigrants everywhere (there are millions of Filipinos living and working abroad), the dominance of Manila-centric ideologies across the varied regional cultures of the Philippines, the enduring hospitality of locals to even the rudest foreigner, and so on. We engage in intercultural dialogue wherever we go, even without leaving our place of residence. In fact, we are allied with each other despite all our differences because we are all human. And so, instead of imposing what has worked for us, it would do us well to learn the many ways of living in the world.
Learning to Listen
Our divisiveness today is rooted in the same human tendency that led to capitalism, totalitarianism, and colonialism, that is, a mindset characterized by kaniya-kaniya (to each their own). Even with good intentions toward collective liberation and indigenization, we might enter haphazardly into the territory of ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and jingoism.
When we view the “colonizer” only as a dangerous foreigner, we tend to ignore the colonizer within, which is the tendency we all have to enter without consent (panghihimasok) and to take without permission (pananakop).
What might it look like to move from the possession and ownership of culture, land, and power to collaboration, stewardship, and mutual flourishing?
As an antidote to harmful social conditioning, we can revisit the intuitive and indigenous. At the core of Philippine folk psychology is a recognition that we are part of a larger whole, not as a singular thing, but as an interplay of interconnected yet beautifully diverse parts. This is most popularly known as Kapwa, a Filipino term that refers to a common identity and a sense of belongingness. The Ilokano concept of Nakem also stands out, as it refers to the relationship of one’s interiority to the larger ecology of people, nature, and spirits. At the meeting of self and other, we see that, despite our differences, we grow from the same earth. It is, as the Bisaya would say, our Kahimtang, our place and shared condition.
Now, if we seek to engage in genuine dialogue across cultural differences within and beyond nations, we can revisit an interesting approach from the Philippine indigenization movements. It is called the kros-katutubo or cross-indigenous approach. The idea is simple: instead of treating other cultures as targets for analysis and domination, we treat them as sources of wisdom. “Indigenous” simply refers to whatever emerges naturally from a particular culture, and so a cross-indigenous approach is essentially a round table, with everyone welcome to sit in. Each of us becomes a culture-bearer. This is relevant in ethical and collaborative social science research (as opposed to exploitative and agenda-driven research), but it is also useful in everyday conversations. This is, fundamentally, an application of Kapwa philosophy. If we are to encourage multicultural diversity, this approach can be incredibly valuable and nourishing.
With respect to the great scholars who came before me, such as Virgilio Enriquez, Rogelia Pe-Pua, and all other critical Kapwa-oriented researchers locally and globally, here are a few important principles for Kros-Katutubo Dialogue:
-
When faced with something or someone new, welcome it or them as an opportunity to recognize a different aspect of your own personhood. Feel with them, be mindful of their moods, and carefully adjust your manners depending on whether something seems appropriate to do or say.
-
Remember that, even if someone is a stranger, they are still knowledgeable in their own way; they have their own life experiences, and they have much to teach you. Be open to this.
-
Do not be quick to sell or expose the knowledge you receive. Your first thought must be whether what you do with this new knowledge will benefit the other. And, if you do have the opportunity to share what you learn, let it be affirmed by them, to ensure that you truly understand.
We do not have to “go native” to understand a different culture, but working with local communities can help us develop our fluency in Kros-Katutubo Dialogue. In this age of information, we are constantly in connection with various cultures around the world, and despite the anonymity and scatteredness of our online spheres, there is the potential to practice intercultural dialogue. In the midst of global confusion and polarization, Kros-Katutubo Dialogue can help bridge divides and guide us toward a collective understanding of the planet we all call home.
{
"article":
{
"title" : "Cross-Indigenous Dialogue to Bridge Cultural Differences",
"author" : "Carl Lorenz Cervantes",
"category" : "essays",
"url" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/readings/cross-indigenous-dialogue-bridge-cultural-differences",
"date" : "2025-06-14 14:26:00 -0400",
"img" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/uploads/cervantes-phillipines.jpg",
"excerpt" : "It seems that, for many people, a “dialogue” looks a lot like an argument, where someone wins based on invisible, yet implicit, ethical standards. This seems to be especially true in discussions on cultural identity and appropriation, where gatekeepers (not culture-bearers) impose very clear boundaries.",
"content" : "It seems that, for many people, a “dialogue” looks a lot like an argument, where someone wins based on invisible, yet implicit, ethical standards. This seems to be especially true in discussions on cultural identity and appropriation, where gatekeepers (not culture-bearers) impose very clear boundaries. Cultures do not have strict boundaries; many borrow (or take) stories and technologies from each other. Something can only ever be fully defined when it is not moving, but that would mean that it is dead. Culture is the current in a river of shared humanity, ever living, ever flowing. What, then, can it look like to affirm and respect differences, while acknowledging the humanity that connects us all?Creating DifferencesIn our attempt to understand the world, we end up endlessly categorizing things into one or the other. In both the scientific arena and the sociopolitical sphere, we have become aware of hierarchies, dichotomies, and differences. In our criticism of certain structures, we are not truly dismantling them; rather, we are constantly affirming them. Even within my field, there is a tendency to contrast indigenous, non-Western values to Western values, usually to show how morally superior we are to the corrupt and hollow West. The most this says is that we value different things, not necessarily that one is better than the other. After all, Western values are indigenous to Western culture in the sense that they evolved through their own history and geopolitical affairs. As it is popularly understood, a major difference between Western and Eastern cultures is that the former is more individualistic, and the latter more collectivistic. Mindless interaction between the two has been, for better or worse, either by fetish or fear. That there are “individualistic” and “collectivistic” cultures is one of the lazier generalizations in cross-cultural psychology. Furthermore, it has nothing to do whatsoever with geographical location: many cultures in South America are community-oriented, whereas many people from industrialized cultures in Eastern Asia are more ambitious and isolated. When we speak, therefore, of “West” and “East” (or even, Global North and Global South), we are not talking literally; we are talking philosophically. I was born and raised as a Filipino, so this essay comes from my perspective, shaped by the culture I have gotten used to. It is a Filipino perspective, but it is not the essential or foundational one. But let us be clear: culture is not bound by one’s nationality. There is no singular “American” culture any more than there is a singular “Filipino” or “Japanese” or “Italian” culture. When we say that some people are more or less “Filipino,” we are not setting them against the standards of a culture, but against the standards of a nation, which is an imagined geopolitical thing—and this is largely shaped by the agendas of those in power. Within what we know as the United States, there are many cultures, and even within a group such as “Asian-Americans,” there are still more varied cultures depending on one’s heritage. Within the Philippines, there are many cultural dichotomies (hating kultural), each representing various social locations by birth, affiliation, or socioeconomic status: taga-lungsod (urban) and taga-probinsya (rural), burgis (elite), and bakya (masses), Kristiyano (Christian, but more generally referring to lowlanders), and katutubo (Indigenous People). There are also nuances by group and by family, which are often lazily described by outsiders in terms of stereotypes. So, when we refer to “culture,” we are actually just talking about adaptive differences shaped by biology, geography, and history. This applies to small groups, but also to groups that come together. Cultural heritage is how we have survived and decorated the places we call home. Language and fashion develop based on what is useful to us. For example, we Filipinos do not have a native word for snow—we borrow the Spanish nieve—because it does not snow here. However, we do have many words for rice at all stages of its household use, even for when it is past its freshness. We are also shaped by our interactions with other cultures, either by imposition or assimilation. Much has already been said about the colonial history of the Philippines, and about how many foreign standards are still imposed today. This is true in economics and politics, but also in smaller, everyday things. For example, in Metro Manila, where the thick concrete absorbs the heat of the tropical sun, warm jackets are worn to signify status and coolness. Colonial mentality is often impractical. That said, as writer Nick Joaquin pointed out in Culture and History, many technologies that we enjoy today were brought in through trade and colonization—this includes our modes of transportation, cooking techniques, the printing press, etc. Adobo, the jeepney, and the Barong Tagalog are distinctly “Filipino” even though they are of foreign origin. There is also much to talk about regarding the interplay of various cultures, and how each one manifests in various places. We can see this in the experience of immigrants everywhere (there are millions of Filipinos living and working abroad), the dominance of Manila-centric ideologies across the varied regional cultures of the Philippines, the enduring hospitality of locals to even the rudest foreigner, and so on. We engage in intercultural dialogue wherever we go, even without leaving our place of residence. In fact, we are allied with each other despite all our differences because we are all human. And so, instead of imposing what has worked for us, it would do us well to learn the many ways of living in the world. Learning to ListenOur divisiveness today is rooted in the same human tendency that led to capitalism, totalitarianism, and colonialism, that is, a mindset characterized by kaniya-kaniya (to each their own). Even with good intentions toward collective liberation and indigenization, we might enter haphazardly into the territory of ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and jingoism. When we view the “colonizer” only as a dangerous foreigner, we tend to ignore the colonizer within, which is the tendency we all have to enter without consent (panghihimasok) and to take without permission (pananakop). What might it look like to move from the possession and ownership of culture, land, and power to collaboration, stewardship, and mutual flourishing?As an antidote to harmful social conditioning, we can revisit the intuitive and indigenous. At the core of Philippine folk psychology is a recognition that we are part of a larger whole, not as a singular thing, but as an interplay of interconnected yet beautifully diverse parts. This is most popularly known as Kapwa, a Filipino term that refers to a common identity and a sense of belongingness. The Ilokano concept of Nakem also stands out, as it refers to the relationship of one’s interiority to the larger ecology of people, nature, and spirits. At the meeting of self and other, we see that, despite our differences, we grow from the same earth. It is, as the Bisaya would say, our Kahimtang, our place and shared condition. Now, if we seek to engage in genuine dialogue across cultural differences within and beyond nations, we can revisit an interesting approach from the Philippine indigenization movements. It is called the kros-katutubo or cross-indigenous approach. The idea is simple: instead of treating other cultures as targets for analysis and domination, we treat them as sources of wisdom. “Indigenous” simply refers to whatever emerges naturally from a particular culture, and so a cross-indigenous approach is essentially a round table, with everyone welcome to sit in. Each of us becomes a culture-bearer. This is relevant in ethical and collaborative social science research (as opposed to exploitative and agenda-driven research), but it is also useful in everyday conversations. This is, fundamentally, an application of Kapwa philosophy. If we are to encourage multicultural diversity, this approach can be incredibly valuable and nourishing. With respect to the great scholars who came before me, such as Virgilio Enriquez, Rogelia Pe-Pua, and all other critical Kapwa-oriented researchers locally and globally, here are a few important principles for Kros-Katutubo Dialogue: When faced with something or someone new, welcome it or them as an opportunity to recognize a different aspect of your own personhood. Feel with them, be mindful of their moods, and carefully adjust your manners depending on whether something seems appropriate to do or say. Remember that, even if someone is a stranger, they are still knowledgeable in their own way; they have their own life experiences, and they have much to teach you. Be open to this. Do not be quick to sell or expose the knowledge you receive. Your first thought must be whether what you do with this new knowledge will benefit the other. And, if you do have the opportunity to share what you learn, let it be affirmed by them, to ensure that you truly understand. We do not have to “go native” to understand a different culture, but working with local communities can help us develop our fluency in Kros-Katutubo Dialogue. In this age of information, we are constantly in connection with various cultures around the world, and despite the anonymity and scatteredness of our online spheres, there is the potential to practice intercultural dialogue. In the midst of global confusion and polarization, Kros-Katutubo Dialogue can help bridge divides and guide us toward a collective understanding of the planet we all call home. "
}
,
"relatedposts": [
{
"title" : "Argentina’s Migration “Security Turn”: How Javier Milei’s Migration Policies Are Reshaping Belonging in Argentina",
"author" : "Marina Simonet Hernandez Jurado",
"category" : "essays",
"url" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/readings/argentinas-migration-security-turn",
"date" : "2026-03-17 10:39:00 -0400",
"img" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/uploads/Screenshot-2026-03-12-at-4.14.21PM.jpg",
"excerpt" : "",
"content" : "In late January, Argentina’s Ministry of Security published a video on Instagram showing federal forces conducting an operation in Villa Celina, a working-class neighborhood in La Matanza, reportedly searching for undocumented immigrants. Days earlier, a Colombian-born trans man who had requested asylum in Argentina, was detained at the airport for six days, unable to communicate with his family. According to La Izquierda Diario, his asylum claim was rejected, and he was placed on a flight to Porto Alegre, Brazil, under the classification of a “false tourist. ” According to an X post by Alejandra Monteoliva, Argentina’s Minister of National Security, “in December and January, nearly 5,000 foreign nationals were either denied entry or expelled from the country”. These episodes unfolded amid significant changes to Argentina’s immigration governance. Before Javier Milei took office in December 2023, immigration policy fell under the Ministry of the Interior, but former Minister Patricia Bullrich transferred oversight of immigration to the Ministry of National Security in November 2025, effectively redefining migration not as a matter of civil administration, but as an issue of national security. There have been no large-scale arrests of undocumented migrants in Argentina. Yet the symbolic force of security operations in poor neighborhoods and the high-profile expulsion of an asylum seeker signals to a broader political narrative. Like Donald Trump’s “law and order” rhetoric in the United States, Milei’s discourse relies on nationalist appeals and moral distinctions between “decent Argentinians” and those portrayed as threats. Slogans such as “el que las hace las paga” (an idiom similar to “do the crime, do the time”) compress complex social realities into punitive certainties, repositioning immigrants, workers, and other vulnerable groups as subjects of suspicion rather than individuals with rights. The correlation between Milei’s and Trump’s anti-immigrant policies is clear from the dates of implementation: Javier Milei took office in December 2023 and made no major changes to immigration policies until May 2025 (only five months after Trump took office) with the publication of the decree 366/2025 that announced modifications to the Migration Law, especially in article 114 where the creation of the “Auxiliary Migration Police” was announced. Furthermore, the desire to emulate Trump’s ICE is explicit even from members of the Milei administration, as reflected in these statements published by La Nacion, by a source close to Patricia Bullrich’s office: “The ANM (National Migration Agency) will adopt a security-driven approach. It will be modeled on the United States Department of Homeland Security, including its Border Patrol and the TSA [Transportation Security Administration, which oversees airport screening]. We are working to establish a civilian-police force operating at all of Argentina’s border crossings — an agency that centralizes migration control and maintains comprehensive records of individuals with criminal backgrounds”. Argentina’s Ambivalent Immigration TraditionArgentina’s national mythology celebrates immigration more explicitly than that of most countries in the Americas—a tradition rooted not only in historical narrative but also in constitutional language, and linked to the country’s vast, sparsely populated territory. The 1853 Preamble famously commits the nation to “secure the blessings of liberty … for all men of the world who wish to dwell on Argentine soil,” embedding an explicit invitation to migrants within the country’s founding legal imagination and framing hospitality as a foundational principle rather than a contingent policy choice. Dominant narratives credit European migration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with shaping Argentina’s economic and cultural development, as well as its national identity—one that has often imagined Argentines as descendants of Europeans and, therefore, distinct from the rest of Latin America. However, enthusiasm for immigration was never universal. In 1899, physician and intellectual José María Ramos Mejía wrote in Las multitudes Argentinas that immigration had “made Buenos Aires ill,” contaminating the traditions of established families. This anxiety reflected elite fears of demographic change, urban disorder, and political radicalism. In the context of the country’s expanding capitalist economy, these fears translated into hostility toward labor organizing, often portrayed as a foreign and subversive activity, as unions began to develop under the influence of anarchist and socialist ideas, including organizations such as the FORA, the country’s first major anarchist labor federation, as documented by Working Class History. The state also responded with legislation facilitating deportations, most notably the 1902 Ley de Residencia (Law 4144), which allowed the executive to expel foreigners deemed a threat to public order. Today’s nostalgia for a “good immigration” rests on two fragile premises. First, European migration is interpreted through a contemporary lens that imagines Europe as inherently prosperous and orderly, projecting present-day “First World” status onto a past marked by poverty, instability, and social conflict. Second, that race did not matter. Yet Argentina’s self-image as a predominantly white nation emerged alongside the violent erasure of much of its Indigenous population, including state campaigns such as the Conquest of the Desert, and the marginalization of Afro-Argentine communities. The celebration of European immigration has always been intertwined with racial hierarchy, evident in the markedly different treatment given to European migrants compared to those from neighboring countries such as Paraguay and Bolivia, who were racialized in distinct ways. The distinction between “good” and “bad” immigrants persists, now recorded through the language of legality and security. The False Security ArgumentThe Milei administration justifies its migration policies in the name of public safety. However, official data complicates that claim. Administrative data from the National Registry of Persons (RENAPER) indicates that Argentina has roughly 2. 3 million foreign-born residents, representing about 5 percent of the total population. Compared to countries where immigration dominates electoral politics, Argentina’s foreign-born population remains relatively small. According to 2023 national penitentiary statistics, foreigners account for roughly 6 percent of Argentina’s incarcerated population, approximately in line with their share of the country’s population. These figures suggest that migrants are not overrepresented within Argentina’s criminal justice system. Essentially, migration has not been a central axis of political instability or social crisis in recent years. Framing migration as a primary security concern appears disproportionate to the available evidence and contrasts with claims by President Javier Milei that migrants disproportionately benefit from public services such as health care and education or contribute significantly to Argentina’s economic crisis. Emulation and Political StrategyThe parallels with Trump-era discourse are not accidental. Javier Milei has openly aligned himself rhetorically with global right-wing leaders who frame migration as both a cultural and criminal threat. The emphasis on border control, internal enforcement, and moral categorization mirrors strategies used by U. S. and European conservatives to consolidate political identity around fear and grievance, while also resonating with broader regional trends. Argentina is not an isolated case in the adoption of restrictive migration policies; rather, it reflects a broader regional trend. In Chile, President-elect José Antonio Kast campaigned on proposals that included large-scale deportations of undocumented migrants. Similarly, in Costa Rica, President Rodrigo Chaves Robles declared a state of emergency in 2023 in response to migrants transiting the country en route to the United States, as reported by Reuters. In a recent interview with Louis Sarkozy, son of former French president Nicolas Sarkozy, Milei argued that when a migrant “does not adapt to your culture,” it constitutes an “invasion” capable of “altering the cultural foundations” of a country. Yet beneath this security narrative lies a broader political project. The administration’s economic agenda (including labor reforms framed as “modernization”) favors deregulation and business interests. In this context, anti-immigrant rhetoric functions less as a response to empirical conditions than as a symbolic instrument: it constructs an internal adversary while redirecting attention away from structural economic transformation. The coherence of this narrative is further complicated by reports, including those published by The New York Times, suggesting an alleged agreement between Trump and Milei for Argentina to receive deported migrants from the United States. In this sense, security has become the language through which a deeper class realignment is articulated. Argentina’s history shows that debates over immigration have often reflected anxieties about identity, race, and labor control rather than measurable threats. The current turn toward securitization thus represents not merely a policy shift, but a transformation in democratic language itself. The question, then, is not whether Argentina faces a migration crisis, the available data suggests it does not, but what political purpose is served by insisting that it does, and what this insistence reveals about the broader direction of governance under Milei. By constructing an internal enemy embodied by vulnerable populations, the government seeks to redirect attention to politically expedient scapegoats. This logic is reflected not only in the immigration policies described here, but also in labor reforms that frame workers’ rights as a burden on public spending, the repression of retirees demanding improved pensions, and new restrictions on protest and the right to strike that limit collective organization. Taken together, these measures suggest that immigration restrictions form part of a broader institutional reconfiguration, one that prioritizes the projection of authority over the resolution of concrete social and economic challenges. In doing so, the government reframes manageable social dynamics as existential threats, a shift that risks undermining the very constitutional principles it claims to defend, both domestically and in its international positioning. "
}
,
{
"title" : "Borrowed Geography: How US Bases Serve the Empire",
"author" : "Jwan Zreiq",
"category" : "essays",
"url" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/readings/borrowed-geography",
"date" : "2026-03-17 10:03:00 -0400",
"img" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/uploads/us-syria.jpg",
"excerpt" : "Who are the bases for? For decades, the United States and Arab regimes have rehearsed the same script: the lie that American military presence in the region protects the Arab world, to preserve stability, and to defend against external threats. Hundreds of bases, tens of thousands of troops, naval fleets parked in the Gulf, all of it, supposedly, for Arab safety. But if protection is the purpose, then the question answers itself: protected from what, exactly? The Arab region has endured more wars, more destruction, and more instability since the establishment of these bases than in any comparable period before them. Iraq was invaded. Syria was shattered. Yemen was starved. Libya was bombed into state collapse. Palestine remains under occupation and siege. If this is what protection looks like, then the word has lost all meaning.",
"content" : "Who are the bases for? For decades, the United States and Arab regimes have rehearsed the same script: the lie that American military presence in the region protects the Arab world, to preserve stability, and to defend against external threats. Hundreds of bases, tens of thousands of troops, naval fleets parked in the Gulf, all of it, supposedly, for Arab safety. But if protection is the purpose, then the question answers itself: protected from what, exactly? The Arab region has endured more wars, more destruction, and more instability since the establishment of these bases than in any comparable period before them. Iraq was invaded. Syria was shattered. Yemen was starved. Libya was bombed into state collapse. Palestine remains under occupation and siege. If this is what protection looks like, then the word has lost all meaning. The Scale of PresenceThe American military footprint in the Arab region is staggering. The United States maintains forces in more than a dozen countries, with at least nineteen military sites, eight considered permanent. Qatar hosts Al Udeid Air Base, the largest US installation in the Middle East, serving as the forward headquarters for US Central Command with around 10,000 troops. As of mid-2025, roughly 40,000 American service members were deployed across the region. The narrative behind the purpose of these bases were sold to Arab governments, and by extension, to Arab publics, as shields against regional threats, primarily framed as Iran. But the record tells a very different story. They have served as launch pads for the destruction of Arab states, not their protection. What the Bases Did to IraqThe invasion of Iraq in 2003 remains the most damning evidence, and a vital one to read alongside what is happening today with Iran. Here is an Arab country, a founding member of the Arab League, destroyed using bases hosted by neighbouring Arab states. Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and others became staging grounds for an invasion whose human cost is staggering. Population-based studies estimate over one million Iraqi deaths resulting from the war, while the Iraq Body Count project has documented between 186,901 and 210,296 violent civilian deaths. Brown University’s Costs of War project estimates that over 940,000 people were killed by direct post-9/11 war violence across Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen, and Pakistan, with more than 432,000 of those being civilians. The bases did not protect Iraq. The bases destroyed Iraq. And the Arab states that hosted those bases were complicit, whether they admitted it or not, in the annihilation of an Arab neighbour. If the bases exist to protect Arab nations from external aggression, then what do you call an invasion launched from those very bases against an Arab capital?At the time of writing this, the pattern is repeating, and it is vital to read what is happening today alongside the record of Iraq. The US-Israeli alliance has launched strikes on a sovereign nation, Iran, calling it preemptive. Unnecessary, unprovoked, and deeply violent. What much Western media has failed to acknowledge is that the strike is unlawful. Not a grey area. A criminal act under international law. The current escalation is driven not by any genuine Iranian or Arab interest but by Israeli strategic calculations that position American bases as staging grounds for strikes against a neighbouring, non-Arab, Muslim-majority country with which Arab states share geography, trade, and centuries of cultural exchange. The shield became the target. Exactly as predicted. Netanyahu’s Guarantee; Peace Is Always One War AwayThere is no better illustration of Israel’s role as the architect of this configuration than the words of Benjamin Netanyahu himself, whose career has been defined by a single recurring promise: destroy the current enemy, and peace will come. The enemy changes. The promise never does and it never will. In the 1980s, Netanyahu told Pat Robertson that the Soviet Union was “a major force” behind international terrorism and that “if you take away the Soviet Union, its chief proxy, the PLO, international terrorism would collapse. ” In 2002, Netanyahu appeared before the US Congress to lobby for the invasion of Iraq. He told lawmakers: “If you take out Saddam’s regime, I guarantee you that it will have enormous positive reverberations in the region. ” Predicting that regime change in Baghdad would trigger the implosion of Iran. In 2015, he returned to Congress to sabotage the Iran nuclear deal, claiming it would guarantee an Iranian bomb. The same language of certainty he had used about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, which never existed. In 2024, he stood before Congress again: “Israel will fight until we destroy Hamas’s military capabilities and its rule in Gaza. That’s what total victory means. ” He framed every front as one war: “When we fight Hamas, we’re fighting Iran. When we fight Hezbollah, we’re fighting Iran. When we fight the Houthis, we’re fighting Iran”. The normalisation agreements of the Abraham Accords were about integrating Israel into a security architecture in which American bases, Arab territory, and Israeli strategic interests become indistinguishable. Even the $142 billion Saudi arms deal is constrained by America’s guarantee that Israel receives more advanced weaponry than any Arab state, a policy known as the “qualitative military edge. ” A deal that, as Foreign Affairs documented, was designed to normalise relations with Israel without demanding, in exchange, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The bases that were once justified as protecting Arab sovereignty now serve a framework that prioritises Israeli security at Arab expense. At no point in this trajectory have the bases served the interests of ordinary Arab citizens. They have served American power projection, Israeli regional ambitions, and the narrow survival calculations of ruling elites who exchange sovereignty for patronage. The geography has been borrowed for decades. The return on that investment has been the destruction of Iraq, missiles falling on Doha, and trillions flowing in the wrong direction. The Geography Reclaims ItselfBut the myth is fracturing. In January 2026, the Iraqi army assumed full control of Ain al-Asad Airbase after a complete US withdrawal, ending more than two decades of American military presence in western Iraq. In Jordan, daily protests after October 7 forced the government to recall its ambassador from Israel; Israel evacuated its own and has not replaced its diplomatic mission since. In Morocco, which normalised relations with Israel in 2020, public support for normalisation collapsed from 31 percent to 13 percent after October 7, and in 2025, the country’s largest labour union called for banning Israeli-bound ships from Moroccan waters and organised protests in support of Gaza. The 2025 Arab Opinion Index, the largest public opinion survey in the Arab world, covering 40,000 respondents across fifteen countries, found that 87 percent of Arabs oppose recognition of Israel, citing its status as a “settler-colonial state occupying Palestine”. Despite the Abraham Accords, support for normalisation dropped even further, including in signatory states. This is not passive discontent. It is a political force constraining governments that would otherwise deepen their alignment with Washington and Tel Aviv. Within the Arab world, a generation of writers, organisers, and researchers from Azmi Bishara’s work on sovereignty and the failure of normalisation, to Abdel Razzaq Takriti’s recovery of Gulf revolutionary traditions, to the policy analysts at Al-Shabaka dismantling the security-sector myth, is building the analytical tools to name what previous generations could not say aloud: that the security architecture sold to them was never designed for their protection, and that genuine regional security begins with sovereignty–not the kind performed at summits and investment forums, but the kind that decides who can and cannot wage war from your soil. The Yemeni blockade of Red Sea shipping, whatever one’s position on the Houthis may be,, demonstrated something that decades of Arab League communiqués never did: that collective action rooted in solidarity with Palestine can materially disrupt the logistics of empire. "
}
,
{
"title" : "Kurdistan and Palestine: Mapping Solidarity Beyond Colonial Borders",
"author" : "Rojin Namer, Jwan Zreiq",
"category" : "essays",
"url" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/readings/kurdistan-and-palestine",
"date" : "2026-03-17 10:00:00 -0400",
"img" : "https://everythingispolitical.com/uploads/shutterstock_232668253-956x539-c.jpg",
"excerpt" : "“No one can understand the suffering of the palestinian people more than the Kurds. No people can share a relationship of empathy more than the peoples of Palestine and Kurdistan. This has been proven by their experiences and joint struggle. It was as such yesterday and it is as such today.” - Duran Kalkan",
"content" : "“No one can understand the suffering of the palestinian people more than the Kurds. No people can share a relationship of empathy more than the peoples of Palestine and Kurdistan. This has been proven by their experiences and joint struggle. It was as such yesterday and it is as such today. ” - Duran KalkanKurds live under imposed borders and know occupation firsthand. People shaped by displacement do not romanticize occupation or occupiers as allies. Kurdish writer Egultekin’s words cut through decades of propaganda that has painted Kurdish movements as Israeli proxies. The truth is simpler and far more painful: the “Kurdish-Israeli alliance” is a narrative weapon wielded by the very states that carved up Kurdistan, designed to turn regional solidarity into suspicion and transform indigenous resistance into foreign conspiracy. As a result, Kurdish and Palestinian struggles have been deliberately misunderstood as competing, when in fact they share a common root. Both of their people live as the largest stateless populations in the world, their identities fractured across borders drawn by colonial powers who never asked for their consent. The Kurds estimated number is 40 to 45 million across Turkey (Bakur), Syria (Rojava), Iraq (Başȗr), Iran (Rojhilat) – names the Kurds use for their own lands– as well as in diaspora. Palestinians number 15. 5 million, scattered across Palestine and the diaspora. Both peoples have lived and survived through genocide, displacement, and the systematic erasure of their existence, still fighting, relentlessly, just to assert their right to exist. The Architecture of FragmentingKurdistan is often described as if it were an absence, a land that does not exist because it does not appear on official maps. This absence is political, not historical. What appears today as four separate “minority” populations spread across widely recognized nation-states was once a connected social, linguistic, and cultural landscape where the Kurds lived as the indigenous people of the mountains, which is where the famous saying comes from, “No friends but the mountains,” a phrase born from watching these mountains given to different countries while the Kurds themselves were denied the ability to move through land that had always been theirs. Those same mountains were also pathways for commerce, escape, and cover for those fleeing or fighting. Many Kurds lived as Koçers–a Kurdish word related to families’ seasonal migration with their belongings, their sheep and goats, between lowland winters and highland summers. Their routes never knew the borders that would later claim to define them. Borders that would turn their ancestral movement into crime, making them “illegal” on land their ancestors had traversed freely for generations. To understand the ties between Palestine and Kurdistan, we must trace the borders that fractured them. In 1916, Britain and France signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement, dividing Bilad al-Sham, the Levant. They partitioned what had been a living geography of different tribes, faiths, and peoples into Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Lebanon, carving nations from what was once one land. The same lines fractured Kurdistan across Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, leaving its people stateless across four different borders. The agreement laid the ground for the Balfour Declaration the following year, which promised Palestine to a European Zionist movement while Palestinian hands still worked its soil, cultivating the land while it’s being promised away. These colonial borders made Kurdish existence itself a threat to four different nation-states simultaneously, which means attempts at autonomy have been met with violent repression to this day. Because acknowledging Kurdish identity challenges the legitimacy of the borders themselves, and challenging the story these states tell about who belongs and who doesn’t, also challenging who controls the resources beneath their feet. Kurdish lands, recognized as one of the world’s most significant untapped energy frontiers, holding massive reserves of oil, gas, minerals, and fertile agricultural land, none of which has benefited Kurdish populations. In Iraq alone, Kurdish regions sit on an estimated 45 billion barrels of oil reserves, resources that all four states have consistently fought to keep out of Kurdish hands. Taken together, control over these resources has allowed these states to determine who holds political power and who remains outside it; who sits at the table, and who is never invited. So when we ask why the mere existence of Kurdish identity remains so threatening to the states built on their erasure, the answer lies in understanding how statelessness becomes not just a condition but a tool. Israel’s interest in Kurdish movements has nothing to do with self-determination and everything to do with weakening Iran, fragmenting Iraq. The same imperial logic that created Kurdish statelessness is now offered back as an alliance. Rojava: Liberation, ethnic and gender justice movementIn 2012, amid the Syrian civil war and the withdrawal of regime forces from Kurdish-majority areas, Kurdish political forces in northern Syria began to organize autonomous self-governance. While defending their territories against ISIS, they initiated a political project grounded in grassroots democracy. This radical resistance movement evolved into what is known today as the Autonomous Administration of North Syria. Crucially, what began in predominantly Kurdish areas expanded to include Arabs, Assyrians, Armenians, Turkmens, and other communities as they joined the autonomous regions. The system adapted a council-based structure extending from local communes to district and regional assemblies. Representation is based not on ethnicity nor religion, but on a shared participation in self-governance. In a region marked by unresolved national questions and sectarian fragmentation, this model represents both a rupture and a possibility; challenging the nation-state through decentralization and multi-ethnic coexistence. Crucially, gender equality is not an addendum but the structure itself. The women’s movement within the revolution has transformed social and political life, placing women’s liberation at the center of democratic transformation. In this way, every governing body in Rojava operates under mandatory co-leadership between a woman and a man, with a minimum 40% quota for women’s participation across all institutions, and women’s councils hold autonomous veto power over community decisions, meaning that no law, no policy, or local decision can ever be moved forward without women’s consent. One of the most notable accomplishments perhaps is how the administration has banned polygamy, child marriage, and forced marriage. Equally significant, it criminalized honor killings and gender-based violence –transforming what were once dismissed as private cultural matters into prosecutable violations. Alongside this legal transformation, women formed their own armed units, the YPJ (Women’s Protection Units), founded in 2013 as an autonomous military formation that fought ISIS on the frontlines as independent fighters, defying the narrative of women fighters as auxiliaries to male forces by becoming instrumental in the liberation of Kobani and the rescue of thousands of Yazidis from genocide on Mount Sinjar. Beyond military defense, Kurdish women established their own justice system through Mala Jin (Women’s Houses), a network of more than 60 centers across the region. Here, women resolve disputes, address domestic violence, and challenge patriarchal practices without state or male mediation; offering reconciliation and mediation processes at the community level, instead of through courts or police. Educational academies followed, training women in everything from political theory to cooperative economics, and in the process, they created the infrastructure for women’s autonomous power. In the spirit of women resisting together, Leila Khaled, the Palestinian revolutionary and PFLP member, has consistently recognized the Kurdish struggle as inseparable from Palestine’s. Khaled visited Leyla Güven, a Kurdish parliamentarian imprisoned for opposing Turkish incursions into Syria, during Güven’s hunger strike demanding an end to the isolation of imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan. Khaled draws direct parallels between the partition of Palestine and the partition of Kurdistan, between the denial of Palestinian return and the denial of Kurdish movement through their mountains. A Bijî Kurdistan & Free PalestineKurdish writer Özlem Goner’s words map the liberation path forward when she wrote: “Kurds and Palestinians in this particular context have suffered various forms of colonial violence at the hands of Turkey and Israel respectively, and it is our alliance, together with all the other colonized and oppressed populations of the Middle East and beyond, that can bring justice and peace. From learning to self-defend together, to invaluable moments of solidarity. ”Daily resistance is not always courageous. Sometimes it is a compromise you’re willing to take in simply choosing not to disappear. In both Kurdish and Palestinian contexts, resistance then, is a condition of existence, perhaps the only one available when your whole being is read as a political stance. The question has never been whether there will be one state or two, but whether that state will be based on equality or continue to be based on domination. The map with further fragmentation of lands promises resolution while preserving the very architecture of oppression. So, until the maps and borders reflect justice rather than colonial division, until Kurds can traverse their mountains and Palestinians can return to their lands, the project of liberation remains unfinished. Liberation will emerge, if at all, from the recognition that to be Kurdish, to be Palestinian, is to have one’s very existence made political by those who drew borders to erase it, and that survival itself no state has managed to extinguish. From women governing in Rojava to families returning to olive groves in Palestine, the stubborn refusal to stop being who we are is the political act no state or borders can legislate away. "
}
]
}